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JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT:
CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
STEVEN S. GENSLER†
ABSTRACT
For thirty years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have relied
on active judicial case management to combat undue cost and delay.
The complaints about cost and delay have not gone away, but few
blame the case-management rules for that. Indeed, lawyers continue
to view active judicial case management as one of the best ways of
reducing cost and delay, and most of the reforms being urged today
seek even greater judicial case management for that reason. But some
think the rulemakers took a wrong turn thirty years ago and that each
round of rulemaking that places more reliance on case management
simply compounds the error.
This Article examines the role of case management in the current
system, the criticisms of the case-management model, and the
implications of those criticisms for the current reform agenda. It is
organized around five questions, each exploring a policy or practical
issue associated with having a pretrial system that (1) has just one set
of rules for all cases, and (2) relies on active judicial case management
to ensure that the pretrial process in each case is just, speedy, and
inexpensive. The stakes are high. If we, participants in the judicial
system, are to continue to rely on active judicial case management to
tailor the pretrial process to the needs of individual cases, then we
must be sure that we understand the implications of doing so. If we
conclude that we do not like those implications, or that there are better
ways to tailor the pretrial process, then we need to take a different
path than the one we have traversed for the last thirty years. But if we
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conclude that we have been on the right path, and that federal courts
should push even farther down that path, then we must be prepared to
meet the crossfire that we will encounter along the way.
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INTRODUCTION
Judging changed thirty years ago. That was when everyday
federal pretrial practice evolved to assimilate the active case1
management approach originally developed for use in cases that
2
were protracted or complex. No longer do federal judges sit back

1. See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 306, 308–09 (1986) (describing the development of managerial judging); Richard L.
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
761, 790–91 (1993) (describing the emergence of managerial judging); William W Schwarzer,
Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge’s Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400, 404 (1978) (describing
courts’ adoption of procedures under the Manual for Complex Litigation premised on active
judicial management).
2. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 938–40 (2000) (discussing case management in protracted
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passively and let the lawyers manage their cases unless and until they
encounter a problem that requires judicial attention. Rather, federal
judges now take control of their cases from the start. The process of
taking control typically begins with the judge issuing a casemanagement order that sets a detailed schedule based on the
particular needs of the case. As the case goes forward, the federal
judge can continue to exercise control by, among other things, closely
managing the scope, timing, and sequence of discovery and
3
dispositive motions. Starting in 1983 and continuing into the present
era, a series of amendments have enshrined active judicial case
management into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules),
formally validating it as a favored practice while encouraging and

cases); see also WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
237–41 (1968) (discussing the emerging philosophy of having a single judge assigned to
“troublesome” cases with the expectation that the judge would then actively manage the case to
expedite the litigation); Study Grp. on Procedure in Protracted Litig., Judicial Conference of the
U.S., Handbook for Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 359 (1960) (“Let it be emphasized this is
not the ordinary litigation; our subject is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few hundred
amid the tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars.”).
3. Judicial case management is also closely associated with the expansion of alternative
dispute resolution processes, particularly the increase in judicial involvement in the settlement
process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I) (“[A]t any pretrial conference, the court may
consider . . . settling the case and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
authorized by statute or local rule.”). The Committee Notes to both the 1983 and the 1993
amendments to Rule 16 sent strong signals to the bench and the bar that alternative dispute
resolution processes and settlement were a big part of the case management that the expanded
version of Rule 16 contemplated. See id. advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment; id.
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. That aspect of judicial case management has
drawn some of the harshest criticism. See Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 75 (1995)
(describing the trend toward and criticism of managerial judging); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982) (discussing the side effects of managerial judging).
And as a wonderful recent symposium evidences, the debate about the role of settlement (and
necessarily the role of judges in promoting settlement) continues to this day. See Symposium,
Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009). The focus of
this Article, however, is on the case-processing aspects of the judicial case-management
movement. That is to say, it focuses on how judges can manage pretrial activities for the purpose
of facilitating a trial or other judicial outcome. Admittedly, these different forms of case
management do not exist in neatly segregated silos. Management activities can lead to a
settlement even if that was not an express goal. And some management activities—such as
sequencing discovery or motion practice—can be designed to target threshold issues with the
idea that resolving them early might lead to an early dispositive ruling or to an early settlement.
That being said, I leave to others, or to another day, the questions raised when federal judges
actively and directly seek to resolve cases by settlement or through noncourt dispute-resolution
processes.

GENSLER IN PRINTER PROOF

672

11/29/2010 7:00:19 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:669

enabling it by giving district judges an ever-expanding set of case4
management tools to be used in its pursuit.
But even though we are nearly thirty years into the casemanagement era, many practical questions about the real-world
effectiveness of judicial case management remain at least partly
unanswered. Does judicial case management really work? Does it
actually reduce expense and delay? Do judges have the right tools at
their disposal? Do judges have the resources they need? Are judges
sufficiently and properly using the tools and resources they do have?
If judges are not using those tools and resources effectively, why is
that occurring and what can be done to change it?
These questions are as important today as they have ever been.
Recent Supreme Court musings about the ability of case management
to control expense and delay—made in decisions that suggest an
enhanced gatekeeping role for pleadings—challenge us to reexamine
the foundations of our system of notice pleading and liberal
5
discovery. Many groups have risen to that challenge, commissioning
new empirical work and offering reform proposals of varying scope
6
and degrees of boldness. This very conference—the 2010 Civil
Litigation Review Conference, held at Duke University School of
Law (Duke Conference)—is itself devoted to assessing the
performance of the existing civil litigation system and exploring
7
possible improvements to it. In this environment, one cannot
overstate the importance of fully understanding what case
management can achieve and how it can be improved.
But one cannot discuss the effective use of case management in
isolation. Case management is a part of the larger, interwoven fabric

4. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE. L.J. 1, 18–36 (2010) (discussing the effect of heightened
pleading standards on Rules 12(b)(6) and 56); infra notes 7–24 and accompanying text.
5. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he success of judicial
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”).
6. This Article references several of these empirical studies. See, e.g., sources cited infra
notes 77–78 , 80, 104, and 281.
7. See Purpose Statement, 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIG., http://
civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/h_RoomHome/4df38292d748069d05256
70800167212/?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); see also Memorandum from Judge
Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Lee H.
Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee 1–2, 7–17 (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2010.pdf (discussing proposals from the 2010 Duke
Conference on how to manage cost and delay in litigation).
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of our dispute-resolution system. It is inextricably bound up with
policy debates about the role of judges and with fundamental
questions about the proper design of pretrial procedure. One
therefore cannot discuss changes to judicial case management without
considering how those changes might alter the role of judges or
whether those changes might conflict with competing norms about
the proper design of pretrial procedure. Although the list of
intersecting foundational questions could no doubt be expanded, here
are five that particularly deserve examination:
1. How should Article III judges be spending their time?
2. Should there be different rules for different types of
cases?
3. Do case-management rules give trial judges too much
discretion?
4. Can case management alone adequately control cost and
delay?
5. Should judges “manage up” or “manage down”?
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I briefly sketch the
role of case management in the current civil pretrial scheme. In
particular, I hope to show how deeply the federal judiciary is
committed to the case-management model. That commitment is
evident not just in the Civil Rules but also in publications issued by
the United States Judicial Conference and the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC). Despite the various objections that have been raised
against active judicial case management, the institutional judiciary’s
commitment to the case-management model has, if anything,
increased over time.
In Part II, I discuss the five questions listed above. Given the
purpose of the Duke Conference, it is not my aim here to propose
final answers to those questions. Rather, I examine them to provide
context for our deliberations about how we might improve upon the
case-management scheme that already exists. These five questions
represent existing critiques of the federal court case-management
8. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831 (2010) (summarizing the effect of heightened pleading standards on
the civil litigation system); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
407, 407 (2010) (“As with a spider’s web, a tug on a single rule can collapse the entire
structure.”).
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scheme. Moreover, they address features or consequences of the casemanagement approach generally and are not limited to whether case
management is effective. Thus, any proposals that would expand or
enhance case management would continue to be subject to these
critiques even if it were shown conclusively that the proposal in
question would in fact improve the trial judge’s ability to manage
cases.
Sound case management is the key to the current federal court
pretrial scheme. Ultimately, I think our best chance for improving the
scheme is to strive for even better case management. And I fully
expect that the Duke Conference will stimulate the development of
many promising suggestions for doing so. That said, we cannot focus
solely and narrowly on whether the proposals that emerge would
improve the ability of federal judges to manage their cases. We must,
at the same time, consider whether those proposals might conflict
with existing policy choices about the role of judges or with various
norms about how best to design a civil litigation system. In the end,
case-management reform is not just a function of finding better or
more effective case-management techniques. It is also a function of
navigating the crossfire issuing from these broader-based critiques of
the case-management model generally.
I. CASE MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Today, active judicial case management is a defining
characteristic of the federal civil pretrial scheme. It is no stretch to say
that active judicial case management has joined the troika of notice
pleading, liberal discovery, and summary judgment as one of the core
features of the federal pretrial process. It was not always so—and the
transition was not without dissent. This Part briefly chronicles the rise
of active judicial case management in the federal court system.
Proceeding chronologically, it shows how case management evolved
from a niche device for dealing with complex and protracted litigation
to a ubiquitous practice employed across the civil docket. Along the
way, it describes how the case-management movement gained the
overwhelming approval of both the bar and the institutional judiciary
despite opposition from some of the most prominent legal
commentators of our time.
At a foundational level, the story of case management in the
federal courts begins with the shift from the so-called master calendar
to individual case assignment. For the first several decades of practice
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under the Civil Rules, cases were put on the master calendar, which
meant that they were not assigned to any particular judge until they
were ready for trial. Rather, the judges shared responsibility for
resolving pretrial matters; when something came up during the
pretrial process that required the attention of a judge, it would be
presented to whichever judge was scheduled to perform the type of
9
activity required. But beginning in the late 1960s, most federal
district courts switched to the single-assignment model, in which
10
every case is assigned to a particular judge for the life of the suit.
The advent of active case management and the switch to single
assignment went hand in hand. Case management is about taking
control. Without having “ownership” of a particular case, the judge
11
lacks both the ability and the incentive to exercise control. In today’s
federal judicial world, where cases are assigned to individual judges
(and where the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts keeps

9. See Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 253, 257 (1985); Peterson, supra note 3, at 68–69; see also MAUREEN SOLOMON &
DOUGLAS K. SOMERLOT, AM. BAR ASS’N, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT:
NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE 33–44 (1987) (discussing the different types of assignment systems
in detail).
10. See Peckham, supra note 9, at 257.
11. The English experience with case management seems to bear this point out. Prompted
by the Woolf Report, England and Wales adopted new Civil Practice Rules that explicitly
heralded a transition from a passive judicial role to a role of active case management. See
Anthony Clarke, The Woolf Reforms: A Singular Event or an Ongoing Process?, in THE CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON 33, 43 (Deirdre Dwyer ed., 2009); Robert Turner,
“Actively”: The Word that Changed the Civil Courts, in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN
YEARS ON, supra, at 82–84. Although many of the Woolf Reforms are viewed as a success,
there appears to be general agreement that English judges have not embraced active case
management. One cause appears to be the lack of a single-assignment system in England. See
Adrian Zuckerman, Litigation Management Under the CPR: A Poorly-Used Management
Infrastructure, in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra, at 105. As Professor
Zuckerman puts it, “No single judge has a personal interest in bringing the dispute to a
successful conclusion with the greatest practicable efficiency.” Id. Lord Justice Rupert Jackson
reached the same conclusion in his report on litigation costs, leading him to recommend that all
cases in the “multi-track” (England’s general track for cases above £25,000) be assigned to a
single judge throughout the life of the case. LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF
CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 393 (2009). On this side of the Atlantic, reform
groups continue to call for single assignment in those state systems that still do not have it,
though the emphasis is more on the benefits of continuity. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP
FOR REFORM: CIVIL CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 8 (2009) (“A single judge should
be assigned to each case at the beginning of the litigation and should stay with the case through
its disposition.”).
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12

statistics on each judge’s docket ), judges have a strong incentive to
find ways to take control of and manage the cases that appear on
13
their individual dockets.
If one is looking for a turning point in the history of judicial case
management in the federal courts, though, it would be 1983 and the
amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26 that took effect that year. For
several decades before then, the trend in discovery rulemaking was
toward changes that reduced judicial oversight and involvement. A
particularly notable example is the 1970 change to Rule 34 that
eliminated the need for parties to seek leave of court and show good
14
cause in order to serve document requests. A less obvious example,
also from 1970, is the change to Rule 33 that made objections suffice
as a response to interrogatories and put the burden on the party
15
seeking answers to challenge the objections. In both cases, the intent
of the change was to reduce court intervention and have the rule
16
operate extrajudicially.

12. See 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2006) (requiring the Administrative Office to publish reports
disclosing for each judge the number of motions that have been pending for more than six
months and the number of cases that have not been terminated within three years). These
reporting requirements originated as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)); see R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice
Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687, 688 (1993) (noting that the Civil
Justice Reform Act could have a significant impact upon civil cases in federal courts). Though
the reporting requirements were initially set to sunset after seven years, Congress made them
permanent in 1997. Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173, 1173 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 471 note).
13. Peckham, supra note 9, at 257; see also 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 48 (1990),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/fcscvol1.pdf/$file/fcscvol1.pdf (“Individual calendaring
increases a judge’s sense of control and responsibility for a case. More important, individual
calendaring makes it possible to track each judge’s disposition rates . . . .”); STEVEN FLANDERS,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FJC-R-77-6-1, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 13–14 (1977) (recounting one judge’s statement that “[t]he
individual calendar system . . . is superb in fostering personal motivation”).
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 & advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. The original
discovery rules also required leave of court to take depositions and to serve interrogatories after
the first set. Both of those restrictions were eliminated in 1946. See id. 30 & advisory
committee’s note to 1946 amendment; id. 33 & advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
As of 2009, only Rule 35 (Physical and Mental Examinations) requires a court order to compel
compliance. See id. 35(a) (“The court where action is pending may order a party whose mental
or physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to submit to a physical or
mental examination . . . .”).
15. See id. 33 & advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
16. See id. advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“The mechanics of the
operation of Rule 33 are substantially revised by the proposed amendment, with a view to
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The Advisory Committee seemed to reverse course in 1983. The
17
word “management” made its first appearance in the Civil Rules.
Rule 16 was transformed from a rule principally directed at trial
18
preparation to one that encouraged—and in some respects
required—trial court judges to take a hands-on approach to managing
19
their cases during the life of the suit. Judicial management was
woven directly into the discovery process when the rulemakers
amended Rule 26(b) to require judges to limit redundant and
20
disproportionate discovery. As Professor Arthur Miller, then the
Reporter to the Advisory Committee, colorfully put it, the 1983
amendment to Rule 26(b) “sold the judges into slavery” by using
21
active case management to curtail discovery abuse.
The case-management provisions of the 1983 amendments were
central to the Advisory Committee’s plan for combating excessive

reducing court intervention.”); id. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“The
revision of Rule 34 to have it operate extrajudicially, rather than by court order, is to a large
extent a reflection of existing law practice.”).
17. Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2199 (1989).
18. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 159 (1997)
(describing the original pretrial focus of Rule 16); Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure
to How Lawyers Litigate: ’Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 234 (2010)
(noting that Rule 16’s original title focused on pretrial procedure); David L. Shapiro, Federal
Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1978–81
(1989) (describing the limitations of early attempts to encourage judicial case management).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Given the
significant changes in federal civil litigation since 1938 that are not reflected in Rule 16, it has
been extensively rewritten and expanded to meet the challenges of modern litigation.”); id.
(“The amended rule makes scheduling and case management an express goal of pretrial
procedure.”); see also id. 16. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Towards Discretion, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1588 (2003) (“Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require
case management activity by all judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity
than was required.” (emphasis added)); Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1984–87 (describing the
purposes of the 1983 amendment of Rule 16); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge
Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (2010) (stating that amendments to Rule 16 “have
not only blessed judicial management, but also made judicial management a requirement in
almost every case”).
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) & advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment
(establishing limits on discovery); see also ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 30–36 (1984) (discussing the
purpose behind the 1983 amendments).
21. MILLER, supra note 20, at 32.
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22

cost and delay. As Professor Miller explains, the “Committee
consciously chose to concentrate on the pretrial phase as the best
23
hope for meaningfully attacking [the] cost and delay [problems].”
The Committee was following the lead of prominent judges who
already had been urging their colleagues on the bench to use casemanagement techniques to pare their cases to what was really at stake
24
and to guide the parties toward faster and less-expensive resolutions.
Not everyone jumped on the bandwagon. Various critics voiced
policy objections to judicial case management. The leading critic is
Professor Judith Resnik. She questions whether the new model of
“managerial judging” is too susceptible to abuse because the casemanagement activities being advocated tend to be less formal, less
visible, and more discretionary than the traditional judicial activities
25
of holding hearings, deciding motions, and conducting trials.
According to Professor Resnik’s critique, active case management
creates a heightened risk that judges would exert activist or
26
ideological pressures in ways that would elude appellate oversight.
More simply stated, the concern is that judges, through unreviewable
case-management techniques, could help parties or positions they
favor and impede parties or positions they disfavor. At a more
pragmatic level, Professor Resnik also questions whether case
22. The 1983 amendments were not directed solely at judicial management; some
provisions were directed at lawyers’ behavior. Rule 11 was overhauled in 1983, ratcheting up the
standard and making sanctions mandatory when a violation occurred. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11
advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. Rule 26(g) was added at the same time. It
requires lawyers to sign discovery requests, responses, and objections certifying that they are
consistent with the rules, not interposed for any improper purpose, and neither unreasonable
nor unduly burdensome or expensive. See id. 26(g). The Rule 26(g) certification requirement
was designed to make lawyers stop and think about the legitimacy and reasonableness of their
discovery requests, responses, and objections before serving them. See id. 26(g) advisory
committee’s note to 1983 amendment. The hope was that the more exacting version of Rule 11
and the new duties under Rule 26(g) would curb cost and delay by leading lawyers to act more
responsibly. See Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of
the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364
(1983) (“Their basic thrust is to remedy problems of expense and delay . . . .”).
23. Miller, supra note 4, at 55.
24. MILLER, supra note 20, at 20–21 (“In a real sense, rule 16 as rewritten, for all of its
subclasses, doesn’t say anything new. It is a synthesis of what is existing practice for many, many
district judges in the United States.”); see also Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case
Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770,
772 (1981) (discussing a judge’s role in the pretrial phase); Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 408
(“Judicial intervention will help ensure that controversies will be litigated in a manner
appropriate to what is truly at issue, and as justly, speedily and inexpensively as possible.”).
25. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 424–31 (discussing the side effects of managerial judging).
26. Id.
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management, which had been advanced as a tonic for undue expense
27
and delay, really did reduce cost or speed up the process. As
discussed more fully below, other commentators share these doubts
28
and concerns. Perhaps the most influential of them is Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who, in a widely cited article, argues that case
management cannot work as intended because the judges do not have
29
the information they need to manage effectively.
Despite these objections, case management became an even
greater part of modern federal civil practice in the years that
followed. Several rounds of amendments to the Civil Rules expanded
30
the trial court’s case-management role. The next big year for casemanagement rule changes was 1993. In that year, Rule 16 was
amended again to further cement and enlarge the trial court’s case31
management authority. Rule 26(b) was amended again as well that
year, conferring on trial courts even broader discretion to manage
32
discovery. Another 1993 change with major implications for case
management was the amendment to Rule 26(f) making the discovery33
planning conference a mandatory event. The animating purpose of
that amendment was to facilitate judicial case management by
providing meaningful inputs for the court to consider at the Rule 16
34
stage. Even Rule 1 was amended to embrace the emerging casemanagement ethos, with the rule now providing that the Civil Rules
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
35
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” The
purpose of the revision was “to recognize the affirmative duty of the
27. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges and Court Delay: The Unproven Assumptions, 23
JUDGES J., Winter 1984, at 8, 10–11 (“Little empirical evidence exists to support the claim that
judicial management works.”); see also infra notes 87–89, 226–27 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 223–36 and accompanying text.
29. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989).
30. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—And the
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 200–02 (2007) (listing
amendments to the case-management rules through the 2006 electronic discovery amendments).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
32. Id. 26(b) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
33. Id. 26(f) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
34. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery,
36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 529 (2009) [hereinafter Gensler, E-volving Duties]. Increasingly, the Rule
26(f) conference is being viewed as a platform for the parties to reach agreement on discovery
issues, especially those involving electronic discovery. See Steven S. Gensler, A Bull’s-Eye View
of Cooperation in Discovery, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 363, 367 (Supp. 2009) [hereinafter Gensler,
Bull’s-Eye View].
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
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court to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that
civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost
36
or delay.”
Even Congress took up the cause in the 1990s. Reduction of
expense and delay was a central theme of the oft-maligned Civil
37
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), which ordered the federal
38
judiciary to experiment with a set of case-management techniques.
The federal judiciary carried out its statutory responsibilities under
39
the CJRA dutifully, though perhaps at times a bit grudgingly.
Although not all of the components of the CJRA were received with
40
eager enthusiasm, the judiciary embraced the CJRA’s main premise
of using case management to reduce expense and delay. In its Final
Report to Congress on the CJRA, the Judicial Conference endorsed
early case management as provided in Rule 16, saying that “[t]he
federal judiciary is committed to, and believes in, sound case
management to reduce unnecessary cost and delay in civil
41
litigation.”
By the mid-1990s, active judicial case management had been a
central feature of federal pretrial practice for over a decade. Yet cost
and delay—concerns that case management was intended to
address—still existed, and may have grown worse, raising again the
question of whether the purported benefits of case management were

36. Id. advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
37. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)).
38. Id. tit. I, 104 Stat. at 5089–98.
39. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT, at xxi (1996) (finding that although all of the pilot districts technically
complied with the CJRA, they sometimes did not engage in the spirit of experimentation
contemplated by the act and often let implementation fall short). Congress passed the CJRA
despite strong opposition from the federal judiciary. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost,
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165, 1190 (1996) (discussing the social and economic consequences of judicial rulemaking);
Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589,
1601–02 (1994) (discussing judges’ fear of Congressional micromanagement in the CJRA).
40. See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and
When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 235–39 (1997) (noting the RAND Report’s findings that many of
the CJRA principles and techniques were eschewed or halfheartedly implemented and
speculating that some of the failure of the CJRA may be attributable to the fact that the federal
judges who were implementing the CJRA were not always committed to the enterprise).
41. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990:
FINAL REPORT 10 (1997) (noting the judiciary’s commitment to case management).
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real. In response, a first wave of empirical studies from 1997
attempted to determine whether case-management techniques really
do reduce expense and delay. The results from these studies have
42
been called inconclusive. A study by the RAND Institute suggested
that early case management might actually increase costs unless the
43
court also imposes a shortened period for discovery. A follow-up
report by RAND massaged the point, concluding that, although early
case management does increase costs up front, it pays dividends later
so long as the court requires the parties to develop and submit a
44
discovery plan.
The empirical studies of that era, however, showed one thing
clearly: that lawyers were convinced of the net benefits of judicial case
45
management. In its 1998 study, the FJC found that lawyers strongly
believed that additional attention from the judge—via availability to
rule on discovery disputes or through discovery management
46
generally—would reduce the expense of discovery. Moreover, when
asked what reform they thought held the most promise for reducing
discovery problems, their “clear choice [was] increased judicial case
47
management.”
Perhaps bolstered—but at least not deterred—by these findings,
the rulemakers continued to employ judicial case management as a
primary tool in the quest to control cost and delay, especially in
discovery. In 2000, the reference point for the scope of discovery was

42. See Rowe, supra note 30, at 193 (“[T]he limited empirical evidence on managerial
judging’s effectiveness at reducing delay and cost . . . remains . . . fairly inconclusive.”); Roselle
L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of an ADR “Confer and
Report” Rule, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 253, 269 (2005) (summarizing the findings of other studies).
43. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 39, at 54–57.
44. James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M.
Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Discovery Management: Further Analysis
of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 652–54 (1998). Perhaps the
most significant contribution of the RAND data in this regard is to highlight a pervasive risk
when adopting rule reforms that front-load effort and expense to the beginning of the case,
which is that front-loading can cause an increase in overall expense if taken too far. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 45–46; Gensler, E-volving Duties, supra
note 34, at 536–38. Although I do not think the current system has passed that tipping point, it is
a concern that we must make sure does not slip off the radar screen.
45. The bar’s demand for case management goes back even further. See Steven Flanders,
Blind Umpires—A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 519–20 (1984).
46. Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 525, 584–87 (1998).
47. Id. at 588.
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narrowed slightly. Previously, parties could take discovery of matters
that were relevant to “the subject matter” of the suit; under the
amended rule, relevance was anchored to the parties’ “claims or
defenses,” though the court could expand the scope of discovery back
48
to “subject matter” relevance for good cause. At the same time, a
redundant cross-reference to the limits set forth in Rule 26(b)(2) was
49
added to the end of Rule 26(b)(1). On the surface, these changes
seem targeted at narrowing discovery. But as the accompanying
Committee Note explains, their actual purpose was to promote more
active case management:
The amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in
regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery. The
Committee has been informed repeatedly by lawyers that
involvement of the court in managing discovery is an important
method of controlling problems of inappropriately broad discovery.
Increasing the availability of judicial officers to resolve discovery
disputes and increasing court management of discovery were both
strongly endorsed by the attorneys surveyed by the Federal Judicial
50
Center.

Finally, case management has taken a central place in discovery
reforms aimed at the problems associated with electronic discovery
(e-discovery). The 2006 e-discovery amendments rely heavily on
51
judicial case management. In general, the e-discovery amendments
eschew specific requirements or limits, opting instead to create
mechanisms designed to flag issues for the parties so they can either
resolve them privately or present them to the court early in the case.
The most concrete example lies in the way the new Rule 34(b)
provisions address the often sticky question of whether parties should
produce electronically stored information (ESI) in its native
electronic file format or in some other format, like a hard-copy
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. See
generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the
Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 16–18 (2001) (detailing “the two-tier
approach retaining subject-matter discovery upon court order granted for good cause”).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
50. Id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
51. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 238 (“The 2006 rule amendments continued the trends
toward requiring the parties and their lawyers to raise problems early, to try to reach
agreement, and to facilitate judicial involvement and supervision when needed. The
amendments, and more importantly, the features of electronic discovery that made the
amendments necessary in the first place, highlighted the importance of judicial involvement in
managing discovery.”).
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printout or an electronic image file (for example, a TIFF image or a
PDF file). Rather than dictate any particular form of production, the
amended rule instead contains several provisions designed to smoke
52
out potential problems before production occurs. At a more general
level, changes to Rule 26(f) direct the parties to discuss various ediscovery issues with an eye toward resolving those issues up front,
53
either with or without the court’s assistance. Complementary
changes to Rule 16 add e-discovery to the list of items to be
considered during the case-management conference and addressed in
54
the case-management order. The recently-enacted Federal Rule of
Evidence 502 continues the case-management theme. By explicitly
providing that court orders regarding waiver are binding in other
55
courts and in cases involving other litigants, it creates an added
incentive for parties to work with the judge to craft creative methods
56
for reducing the cost and delay associated with e-discovery.
Over the past thirty years, the federal judiciary’s commitment to
case management has also manifested itself in the policies and
practices promoted by the institutional arms of the federal judiciary.
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee gave strong support to
active case management, stating, “We endorse the trend toward more
57
vigorous case management by district judges.” In 1995, the Long
58
Range Plan of the Federal Courts recommended that “[t]he district
59
courts should enhance efforts to manage cases effectively.” Both the
Federal Courts Study and the Long Range Plan stressed the

52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C) (permitting the requesting party to specify the form or
forms in which ESI is to be produced); id. 34(b)(2)(D) (permitting the responding party to
object to the requested form and, if not producing ESI in a requested form, state the form or
forms it intends to produce).
53. See id. 26(f); advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“When the parties do
anticipate disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, discussion at the outset
may avoid later difficulties or ease their resolution.”).
54. See id. 16(b)(3)(B) & advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; id. 16(c)(2).
55. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
56. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 238 (“[Rule 502] provides an additional incentive for
parties to seek—and for courts to provide—early involvement to set the terms and limits
governing discovery.”).
57. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
100 (1990).
58. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995).
59. Id. at 70.
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importance of educating judges in case management. Indeed, the
Long Range Plan went so far as to say, “In the future, large dockets
will test the management abilities of even the best judges. Intensive
61
case management training will be essential.” Not surprisingly,
judicial education programs have regularly promoted the benefits of
62
case management and offered tips for effective management.
The ascendance of the case-management model during this
period also can be seen in the publications that the institutional arms
of the federal judiciary wrote for federal judges. As late as 1977, a
study published by the FJC urged judges to take early control by
setting firm deadlines but to otherwise minimize the amount of time
63
they invested in their cases until discovery was complete. By the
time of the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26, however,
judges were being told that time spent in active management of
64
discovery would pay rich dividends later. In 1991, the FJC published
65
a pamphlet titled The Elements of Case Management. Invoking the
goal of achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” administration
of justice set forth in Rule 1, the pamphlet begins by stating that “[i]f
judges are to achieve this goal in the face of scarce judicial resources
and the rising cost of litigation, they must manage the litigation
66
67
process.” And that includes managing discovery.

60. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 57, at 100 (“The growing importance of
case management techniques calls for even more judicial education about the range and
implementation of such techniques to eliminate unnecessary cost and delay while maintaining
judicial impartiality.”); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 58, at 71
(recommending that “[t]he Federal Judicial Center should continue to sponsor the requisite
training and education for judges”).
61. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 58, at 110.
62. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 948–49 (noting that, as early as 1971, judges teaching
seminars for new judges “favored and taught active judicial involvement in settling cases”); see
also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 21 (noting the judiciary’s
“longstanding commitment to judicial and staff education in case management” and
recommending that it be extended to the entire legal community).
63. See FLANDERS, supra note 13, at 17 (“To handle its case load efficiently, a court must
minimize the time judges spend on the initial stages of their cases and require lawyers
themselves to resolve the relatively petty disputes (especially discovery questions) in most
instances.”).
64. MILLER, supra note 20, at 34–36 (“Yes, judge, spend the time [managing discovery] up
front, and we believe it will save you double time or triple time down the line.”).
65. WILLIAM W SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF
CASE MANAGEMENT (1991).
66. Id. at 1.

GENSLER IN PRINTER PROOF

2010]

11/29/2010 7:00:19 PM

JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT

685

Today, the message from the institutional federal judiciary
68
regarding case management is unambiguously positive. The Civil
69
Litigation Management Manual, published by the U.S. Judicial
Conference in 2001, advises that “[e]stablishing early control over the
70
pretrial process is pivotal in controlling litigation cost and delay.”
The Civil Litigation Management Manual later advises trial judges
about the importance of the Rule 16 conference:
The Rule 16 conference is generally the first point of significant
contact for establishing case management control. You have an
unparalleled opportunity to set the pace and scope of all case
activities that follow, to look the lawyers and litigants in the eye, and
71
to set the tone of the case.

In 2006, the FJC published a second edition of The Elements of Case
Management, this time adding to the title the phrase A Pocket Guide
72
for Judges. Like the first edition of the pamphlet, the second edition
minces no words about the ability of case management to save time
and expense:
A small amount of a judge’s time devoted to case management early
in a case can save vast amounts of time later on. Saving time also
means saving costs, both for the court and for the litigants. Judges
who think they are too busy to manage cases are really too busy not
to. Indeed, the busiest judges with the heaviest dockets are often the
73
ones most in need of sound case-management practices.

67. See id. at 11 (“[The power granted under Rule 26] ought to be used to prevent
duplication, to require lawyers to use the least expensive way to get necessary information, and
to keep discovery costs from becoming disproportionate to what is at stake in the lawsuit.”).
68. As one observer puts it, “The Judicial Conference of the United States, the
policymaking body for the administration of the federal courts, promotes a legal culture that
encourages judges to actively manage litigation as early and as much as necessary.” John Lande,
The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in Courts and Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 81, 90 (2008).
69. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL (2001).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 14.
72. WILLIAM W SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF
CASE MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006).
73. Id. at 1. Nearly identical sentiments appeared in the first edition of that publication. See
SCHWARZER & HIRSCH, supra note 65, at 1(“Discovery is probably the single greatest source of
cost and delay in civil litigation, but judges can do much to mitigate this problem.”). Another
prominent advocate of case management, Judge Charles Richey, echoed those sentiments in his
writings. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit of Bench and Bar,
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At the individual-judge level, some of the most prominent
federal judges of our day remain ardent supporters of judicial case
management. District Judge Lee Rosenthal, former Chair of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and current Chair of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, recently
canvassed the many benefits of judicial case management and
explored ways to improve the effective application of the existing
74
case-management rules. In his contribution to the Duke Conference,
Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm (a current member of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules) and Elizabeth Cabraser similarly urge that
we make a renewed commitment to better using the existing case75
management rules before turning to more radical structural changes.
And in his contribution to the Duke Conference, District Judge
Michael Baylson (also a current member of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules) adopts a theme of “missed opportunity” as he
explores various shortcomings in how trial judges are currently using
76
the existing case-management provisions.
139 F.R.D. 525, 527 (1992) (“[D]evoting a small amount of time to early case management can
save a great deal of time as the case proceeds. The judges who believe they do not have time to
manage their cases are, in fact, too busy not to manage them.”).
The federal court system is not alone in its enthusiasm for case management. In 1999,
the new Civil Procedure Rules in England that grew out of the Woolf Report embraced case
management as a means of controlling cost and delay. See CPR, (2006) pt. 1.4(1) (U.K.) (“The
court must further the overriding objective [of dealing with cases justly] by actively managing
cases.”). The recent report on litigation costs by Lord Justice Jackson suggests that English civil
procedure will move even further toward case management as a means of controlling expense
and delay. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 394 (“All the feedback which I have received during
the Costs Review indicates that (despite academic scepticism) both costs and time are saved by
good case management. By good case management, I mean that a judge of relevant expertise
takes a grip on the case, identifies the issues and gives directions which are focused upon the
early resolution of those issues.”).
74. See Rosenthal, supra note 18.
75. See Paul W. Grimm & Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil
Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burdens, or Can Significant
Improvements Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules? 32 (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/47D6E0
CDEF6484DA852576EA004A9FDA/$File/Judge Grimm, The State of Discovery Practice in
Civil Cases.pdf (“The existing Rules of Civil Procedure . . . are a rich source of principled and
cost-effective guidelines for improved case management, which have yet to be fully explored,
appreciated, and utilized in civil litigation.”).
76. See Michael M. Baylson, Are Civil Jury Trials Going the Way of the Dodo? Has
Excessive Discovery Led to Settlement as an Economic and Cultural Imperative: A Response to
Judge Higginbotham and Judge Hornby 14–22 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/D0222A
472558384D8525768D00588265/$File/Judge Baylson, Are Civil Jury Trials Going the Way of
the Dodo.pdf (“Judge Higginbotham bemoans the lack of personal appearances before a district
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Is all that confidence in the benefits of judicial case management
warranted? A second wave of empirical studies on discovery and case
management has attempted to provide some answers. Though I do
not intend to thoroughly canvass or analyze the new data—the
sources of that data addressed the Duke Conference directly—I think
it fair to say that the results this time around are more consistently
and convincingly encouraging. The FJC Survey respondents seemed
rather content with the current case-management scheme, wanting
77
neither more nor less case management. The American Bar
Association (ABA) Section of Litigation Survey respondents
overwhelmingly agreed that early intervention by judges helps to
78
narrow the issues and control discovery. The ABA Survey also
reported that client satisfaction increased when the judge was actively
79
involved in managing the case. The joint survey by the Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) and the
American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) showed similarly strong
80
support for active judicial case management among its respondents.
Any doubts about the bar’s craving for case management were erased
at the Duke Conference itself. In reporting on the Conference, Judge
Mark Kravitz, the current Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, remarked, “Pleas for universalized case management achieved
81
virtual, perhaps absolute, unanimity.”
Of course, lawyer satisfaction does not prove that case
management is working any more than Judge Easterbrook’s
skepticism proves that it is not. Nonetheless, the fact that lawyers
across the board remain convinced of the benefits of active case
management is well worth noting. If the federal civil litigation scheme

judge, the long time taken for briefing and then ruling on summary judgment, the lack of oral
argument on motions, as well as the dearth of trials. These all reflect missed opportunities.”).
77. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 67–68 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.
78. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT
124–25 (2009).
79. Id. at 126.
80. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 18–19 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm
?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4053.
81. Memorandum from Judge Kravitz to Judge Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 8.
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is to continue to rely on judicial case management, support from the
bar is important, and perhaps critically so. The case-management
model probably could not work, and certainly could not work very
well, if lawyers and litigants overwhelmingly disliked or distrusted it.
Case management works best when judges and parties pursue it
willingly and in the spirit of joint enterprise. That does not mean that
all lawyers will like the case-management decisions they get in
individual cases. But what matters is that lawyers generally support
the pursuit of case management ex ante. If lawyers resisted the idea of
case management, chafing against it even before they knew the
outcome, it would produce an intolerable friction.
All things considered, the recent survey data give welcome cause
for hope that the path we have pursued for the last thirty years has
not been one giant misstep and may even have been the right step.
Future analysis of those data may also provide sound direction for
any next step.
II. THE CROSSFIRE
For now, let us assume that we can improve judicial case
management. Let us assume that, with the renewed commitment
urged by Judge Rosenthal and Judge Grimm, and with Judge
Baylson’s eye toward capitalizing on existing opportunities, we can
82
improve our usage of the existing case-management tools. Let us
further assume that, though the quiver is already well-stocked, we can
83
add even more “managerial arrows” when the need is shown. In
short, let us assume—and I think the assumption is a safe one—that
we have not yet perfected the case-management scheme we first
started experimenting with in 1983.
A discussion that focused solely on perfecting the 1983 vision of
judicial case management would be well worth having. But any such
discussion would be incomplete. Case management is not a selfcontained concept. Nor does it exist in a vacuum. The question of

82. To cite just one example, Judge Rosenthal explains in detail all that could be
accomplished if judges conducted live scheduling conferences, in person, with the lawyers in
attendance. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 241. When judges hold perfunctory Rule 16
conferences, or do not hold them at all, there can be no genuine exchange about the needs of
the case, no inquiry into whether the parties have taken the appropriate planning steps, and no
meaningful opportunity to identify and focus on the issues that are the most critical to resolving
the case. Id. (listing the benefits of active judicial involvement).
83. Rowe, supra note 30, at 196.
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case management is inextricably intertwined with our vision of what
judging should be and with our beliefs about how the rules of
procedure should be structured. Any reforms that seek to improve
upon the judicial case-management model cannot help but send
ripples back toward those larger policy questions.
The connection between case management and these
foundational questions of system design is amplified when the reform
comes from the other direction. The 1983 model of judicial case
management assumes a particular role for judges and is built on
features of the civil pretrial system—most notably, having a single set
of rules for all cases and relying on judicial discretion to tailor the
procedure to the case—that are a legacy from 1938. The five
questions introduced earlier and explored herein highlight differing
views about the proper role of judges and challenge our continued
fidelity to those legacy features of the current structure of the Civil
Rules. Any significant changes to the role that we ask judges to play,
or to the general design of the Civil Rules, would have seismic
implications for case management. In other words, the type and
degree of case management that we ask of judges greatly depend on
the choices we make about the role of judges and the design of our
system of procedure. Thus, were we to make fundamental changes to
the system, those changes would not send mere ripples back to case
management; they would send a tsunami.
In this Part, I examine five policy and design questions. Many of
these questions run together, both with each other and with what I
have carved out as the core “efficacy” question of case management.
Some of the same general issues pop up in several of the questions.
Nevertheless, I think there is value in framing these questions
separately because those general issues often take on a different hue
when examined in a different light. Moreover, tweaking a casemanagement issue to alleviate concerns associated with one of those
questions may exacerbate concerns raised by another. To return to
the metaphor of this Article’s title, in the heat of battle it is rarely
enough simply to know that you are being fired at. Survival may
depend on clearly identifying all sources of fire, lest an effort to repel
one source exposes your back to another.
A. How Should Article III Judges Be Spending Their Time?
This Section addresses a threshold issue that has divided judges
and scholars since the inception of the case-management movement:
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even if case management is an effective technique, is it something that
judges—and, in particular, Article III judges—should be doing? Or is
it a nonjudicial task that erodes the true adjudicative role of the judge
while vesting district judges with management powers that can be
abused in ways that are hidden from view and unreviewable? This
Section also addresses the extent to which, in the federal court
system, we can address those concerns by delegating case
management to non–Article III magistrate judges.
For as long as we have had a culture of judicial case
84
management, we have also had critics of that culture. One criticism
is that case management is simply a misuse of the Article III judiciary.
According to this view, when Article III judges spend their time
managing cases, they are not spending their time doing what Article
III judges were meant to do—trying cases. This theme was prevalent
in (though not the animating force behind) much of the recent
85
discussion about vanishing trials. It is also strongly evident in the
writings of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who laments that the casemanagement model has so removed the trial judge from the
courtroom that “we are witnessing the death of an institution whose
86
structure is as old as the Republic.” Professor Resnik worries that
“[t]he charge to judges to manage cases competes with and
marginalizes the charter to adjudicate,” ultimately depriving the
public of the contributions that public adjudication makes to a
87
functioning democracy. In earlier work, these and other concerns led

84. We have also had staunch defenders of case management. For one well-known defense,
see Flanders, supra note 45.
85. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1274 (2005) (“[I]f we want a legal system in which judges and juries
devise public standards and assess accountability, particularly that of powerful actors, we need
enough trials to do that job.”) [hereinafter Galanter, Hundred-Year Decline]; see also Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial,
LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 1.
86. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. 745, 747 (2010). To be precise, Judge Higginbotham’s criticism is not that Article III
judges should allow their cases to grow, unpruned, according to the whims and extravagances of
the litigants. He believes that judges can and should manage discovery. But he believes that they
should do so as a means of pushing the case cheaply and quickly toward trial, and not for the
purpose of disposing of the case during the pretrial phase. See id. at 763 (“[T]he principal work
of a district court is to try cases and to offer litigants the opportunity for a reasonably prompt
and impartial trial.”).
87. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, Jeremy Bentham and the Privatization of
Adjudication, 49 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 205, 211–12 (2010).
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Professor Resnik to suggest that the case-manager model so distorts
the role of the judge as to undermine the basis for job and salary
88
Professor Stephen Subrin offers this sobering
protection.
assessment: “A totally unconstrained adjudication system requires
judges to become what they became: managers. This is not what it
89
meant to be a wise judge for the past three millenni[a].”
A different criticism of the case-management model relates to
90
judicial power and its abuse. Professor Resnik has famously
criticized the case-management model as a potentially new and
dangerous form of judicial activism. According to this critique,
“because managerial judging is less visible and usually unreviewable,
it gives trial courts more authority and at the same time provides
litigants with fewer procedural safeguards to protect them from abuse
91
of that authority.” Professor Subrin has expressed similar concerns
about the power that federal judges wield via the largely discretionary
92
rules governing case management. Professor Paul Carrington, who
once served as the Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
made this observation: “The hidden effect of case management is a
transfer of power away from individual parties and their lawyers, and

88. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 1002–03 (“The judicial embrace of roles held by other
social actors—the homogenization of the various kinds of dispute resolvers—has made more
difficult the task of explaining why some judges should be specially protected, insulated, and
respected.”).
89. Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 100–01 (1997).
90. The aspect of case management that typically draws the heaviest fire is judicial
involvement in settlement. One prominent concern is that judges deplete the universe of tried
cases by pushing too hard for settlement. See Galanter, Hundred-Year Decline, supra note 85, at
1266 (“Th[e] transformation of judicial product involves factors that played at most a minor role
in the long-term decline of trials. One such factor is the ascendance of a judicial ideology that
commends intensive judicial case management and active promotion of settlements (with
settlement seen as a result superior to trial).”). Another concern is that the judge who is to try
the case should not be involved in the settlement process, because the parties might feel
pressure to conform to the judge’s views on settlement or the judge might become biased during
the course of the settlement process. See Resnik, supra note 3, 425–31. This Article does not
address the role of trial judges in settlement.
91. Resnik, supra note 3, at 380; see also Peterson, supra note 3, at 45 (arguing that case
management gives federal judges too much primary discretion (making case management
standardless) and secondary discretion (making case management guided but unreviewable)).
92. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 50 (1994) (stating that if we had
substance-specific rules, then “[f]inally, judges [could] begin to return to their proper roles—
deciding, or facilitating the decision of cases on their merits; making decisions about cases that
apply to more than the one case that is in front of them; and having rules to guide them in their
future decisions”).
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also from juries or appellate courts who would review decisions on
93
the merits when and if rendered.”
So, how should Article III judges spend their time? Deciding
merits issues? Managing their cases? The federal judiciary’s answer is
“both.” In the Civil Litigation Management Manual, the Judicial
Conference puts the question and answer this way: “Is a federal judge
an adjudicator or a case manager? . . . In fact both functions—
adjudication and case management—are critical judicial roles, the
94
second used in service of the first.”
I think that is correct. Good case managers work with the parties
and their lawyers to identify the real issues in dispute and to identify
how best to proceed to resolve those issues. Good case managers
show the parties and their lawyers, through their management
activities, that they have taken the time to truly understand what the
case is about and that they are willing to invest their time to ensure
that the pretrial process remains focused on the real issues. Good case
management is not an opaque process that occurs solely behind
chambers’ doors. Rather, good case managers interact with the
parties and welcome—if not invite or even require—client
participation. Practiced that way, case management provides the
parties not just with an opportunity to be heard but also with an
opportunity to see (and feel) that justice is being done.
Consider the type of Rule 16 conference suggested by Judge
95
Rosenthal. In one of these live conferences, the lawyers (and
sometimes also the parties) would be in the same room as the judge.
Some or all of the following might take place:

93. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 62 (1997). Professor
Stephen Yeazell makes the intriguing observation that the shift in power from appellate courts
to trial courts is a result of increasing the number of pretrial events that do not produce
immediately reviewable judgments. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of
Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 660–61. He notes that although the 1938 rules
shifted the focus away from pleadings and trial (the front and the back of the case) toward casedevelopment activities that occur in between, they left the final-judgment rule intact. Id.
Professor Yeazell also suggests that appellate courts, having been displaced by the rulemaking
process as the principal producers of rules regulating trial-level activity, have embraced more
discretionary review standards because they no longer have a personal interest in the
development of those regulations. Id. at 666.
94. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 1.
95. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 241–42.
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• The lawyers and the judge might engage in a genuine
exchange about the case so that the judge can learn
critical information about the needs of the case.
• The judge might learn whether the parties have had a
meaningful Rule 26(f) conference or whether they have
just gone through the motions and therefore are not truly
in a position to discuss their pretrial needs.
• The judge might learn whether there are threshold issues
to be resolved and might consider having the parties
conduct discovery or make dispositive motions in stages.
• The judge might discuss e-discovery issues with the
parties, exploring ways to focus the process and address
96
potential problems before they mushroom.
The overriding theme is that judges who take the time to talk with the
lawyers and involve the parties at the Rule 16 stage are in a much
better position to tailor the pretrial process to achieve the “just,
97
speedy, and inexpensive” determination of the claims. Moreover,
these types of activities, geared toward facilitating a prompt and
efficient resolution of the merits, strike me as being just as “judicial”
98
as deciding motions or presiding over a trial. But not everyone
agrees, and I certainly respect the views of those who see things
differently.

96. See id. at 241. If the participants at the Duke Conference are any indication, this is also
the type of Rule 16 conference that lawyers would like judges to conduct. See Memorandum
from Judge Kravitz to Judge Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 8 (“The first Rule 16 conference should
be a conference. It should be planned carefully by the lawyers, seized as an invaluable
opportunity by the judge, and often attended by the parties. The parties should be made aware
of the strengths and weaknesses of their positions, the costs of litigating, the means available
[for] reducing the costs of litigating, and the availability of alternative dispute resolution
methods.”).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
98. Cf. Alvin H. Rubin, The Managerial Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About
Achieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4
JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (1979) (“The judicial role is not a passive one. ‘A purely adversarial
system, uncontrolled by the judiciary, is not an automatic guarantee that justice will be done. It
is impossible to consider seriously the vital elements of a fair trial without considering that it is
the duty of the judge, and the judge alone, as the sole representative of the public interest, to
step in at any stage of the litigation where his intervention is necessary in the interests of
justice.’” (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision Over
Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 191, 211, 216 (1961))). According to Professor Rosenberg, the 1983
Advisory Committee adopted Judge Rubin’s views. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 2209.
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For those who think that case management is proper and
important but believe that Article III judges should devote their time
to making merits decisions, one solution is to delegate the casemanagement tasks—including scheduling and overseeing discovery—
to magistrate judges. Presumably, the Article III judges then would
be more able and willing to engage with the parties regarding the
merits of the case. Delegating the pretrial case management to
magistrate judges is also seen as a way of eliminating the threat of
merits coercion posed when the Article III judge who will decide the
99
merits gets involved in management issues.
There is much to be said in favor of the magistrate judge system.
The federal judicial system has come to rely increasingly on
100
magistrate judges to assist with civil pretrial matters. The Judicial
Conference recommended the effective use of magistrate judges to
101
combat cost and delay in its Final Report to Congress on the CJRA.
Similarly, the Judicial Conference’s Long Range Plan promotes the
102
enhanced use of magistrate judges for civil pretrial matters. Nobody
doubts that there are scores of excellent magistrate judges across the
country providing exemplary civil case-management service.
But, as is true with so much in the world of civil case
management, there is a second side to this story. Some view dividing
responsibility between “the merits” and “case management” as an
artificial separation that undermines efficiency and fairness. In its
103
recently published Civil Caseflow Management Guidelines, the
IAALS recommends that “[a] single judge . . . be assigned to each
case at the beginning of litigation and . . . stay with the case through

99. See Peterson, supra note 3, at 92 (“Any effective solution should provide for the
division of [magistrate and Article III] powers to prevent the use of substantive decision-making
power as a coercive tool in pretrial management.”).
100. On referral from the district judge, magistrate judges may resolve nondispositive
matters (subject to district court review for clear error) and may enter findings and
recommendations as to dispositive matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 72.
With consent of the parties, magistrate judges may assume full authority over those matters
(and also conduct the trial if needed). 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 73.
101. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 2, 20 (identifying the
reduction of cost and delay as an overall goal and recommending the effective use of
magistrates).
102. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 58, at 101–02 (“Magistrate judges
should perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally permissible and consistent with
sound judicial policy.”).
103. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11.
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104

The Civil Caseflow Management Guidelines
its disposition.”
elaborate on this principle:
The use of a single judge assigned to a case from beginning to end
provides the parties in the litigation with a sense of continuity. With
respect to discovery issues and disputes, the same judge who handles
the pretrial and trial matters is in a better position to resolve
discovery matters because of his or her familiarity with the issues,
the parties, the history of the case, and the relationship between the
parties. For cases that go to trial, the judge who handled all pretrial
and discovery matters in a case is in a better position to try the case,
based on a familiarity with the issues, the parties, and the history of
105
the case.

Perhaps the principal targets of this recommendation are state court
systems that still do not assign cases to a single judge for pretrial
matters. But as written—and, I believe, as intended—it is also
directed at what some call the de facto bifurcated bench in some
federal court districts where the Article III district judges routinely
delegate all scheduling and discovery management to their magistrate
judges.
The results from the recent ABA Section of Litigation Survey
offer some useful insights into whether lawyers think that using
magistrate judges to handle pretrial matters conflicts with this “single
judge” principle. More than 85 percent of the survey respondents
supported the general principle of having a single judge “handle a
106
case from start to finish.” But when asked whether it was necessary
for the judge who would try the case to also handle all pretrial
107
matters, the level of agreement dropped to below 65 percent.
Moreover, when the survey question specifically inquired into using
magistrate judges for pretrial matters, nearly 60 percent of the
104. Id. at 5; see also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., PILOT
PROJECT RULES 4 (2009) (“As soon as the complaint is filed, a judge will be assigned to the case
for all purposes, and . . . will remain assigned to the case through trial and post-trial
proceedings.”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., supra note 80, at 18 (“A single judicial officer should be assigned to each case at
the beginning of a lawsuit and should stay with the case through its termination.”).
105. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 8–9.
106. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 78, at 114 (showing that 85.8 percent of total
respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or “[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[o]ne judicial officer should
handle a case from start to finish”).
107. See id. at 115 (showing that 64.9 percent of total respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or
“[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[t]he judge who is going to try the case should handle all pre-trial
matters”).
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respondents said they believed that it did not matter whether the trial
judge or a magistrate judge handled the pretrial matters (so long as
108
the pretrial matters are handled promptly). These data indicate that
some of the support for the “one judge” principle extends only to the
notion that cases should be assigned to individual judges from the
start and not left on the general draw until set for trial. But they also
show that a significant percentage of the respondents (more than 40
percent) specifically disapprove of delegating pretrial matters to
magistrate judges.
The IAALS and the ACTL are not alone in questioning the
wisdom of separating the case-management and merits-adjudication
functions. More than twenty years ago, Professor Linda Silberman
worried that reflexively referring all discovery matters to magistrate
judges might actually undercut effective case management by taking a
key aspect of overall case management out of the district judge’s
109
hands. Judge Easterbrook—who is well known for his skepticism of
case management generally—has argued that assigning discovery to
magistrate judges is inefficient because (in his experience) the
assignment typically does not give the magistrate judge the authority
110
to limit discovery to potentially dispositive slices of the case. In his
paper for the Duke Conference, Judge Higginbotham, although
agreeing that some case management is valuable, also criticized the
practice of delegating case management to magistrate judges; in his
view, that delegation is symptomatic of a disturbing trend of making
111
the trial court process a paper process of delegable duties.
Ultimately, the issue comes down to this: even if we could all
agree that case management by somebody is a good thing, we still
have to find someone to do it. Any reform efforts that would increase
the amount of case management performed by Article III judges must
be prepared to meet the criticism that doing so will only further erode
our sense of what it means to be an Article III judge. Delegating the

108. See id. at 116 (showing that 58.5 percent of total respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or
“[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[i]t does not matter whether the trial judge or a magistrate judge
handles pre-trial matters, so long as they are handled promptly”).
109. Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2141 (1989). Alternatively, Professor Silberman worried that if
delegation were successful it would stifle real procedural reform by relieving the symptoms of
cost and delay without addressing the root causes. See id. (“[T]o take burdensome discovery
away from judges . . . place[s] it elsewhere in the system.”).
110. Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 639–40.
111. Higginbotham, supra note 86, at 759–60.
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case-management duties to magistrate judges might address that
particular concern, but proponents of true single-assignment schemes
object that the bifurcated bench undermines the efficiencies that case
management is meant to supply. Something has to give. If we are
going to have case management, someone has to do it. If neither
Article III judges nor magistrate judges should manage federal civil
112
cases, then who? If neither is acceptable, and there is no other
source to provide it, then we cannot rely on case management to
achieve the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of
113
actions.
B. Should There Be Different Rules for Different Types of Cases?
Properly done, active judicial case management ensures that the
pretrial activities in each case are appropriate and proportional to the
needs of the case. Judges individually tailor the pretrial process in
each case, sometimes by guiding the parties to make better choices,
sometimes by working with the parties to help them agree on the size
and scope of the pretrial activities, and sometimes by resolving
disputes and imposing limits when the parties cannot agree or when
the parties both engage in unreasonable behaviors. The notion of
tailoring, however, is directly linked to the fact that, for the most part,
the Civil Rules are the same for all cases, regardless of their shape or
size. If each case starts with the same set of Civil Rules, but the goal is
for each case to have a tailored pretrial process, then the task of doing
the tailoring must fall to the parties (if they can agree) or to the judge.
But judicial case-tailoring is not the only method available for
dealing with differences in the pretrial needs of different cases. This
Section focuses on a different approach—having different sets of
rules for different types of cases. One possibility might be to have
different sets of rules (or special rule provisions) for specific subject
areas. Another possibility might be to distinguish between cases

112. This is not to concede that “neither” is the correct answer. To the contrary, I think the
correct answer is “both.” As discussed above, I think case management is not just an
appropriate but a critical aspect of the pretrial process and that it is wholly consistent with the
role of the district judge. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. But I also think that it is
perfectly appropriate for district judges to capitalize on the assistance available from magistrate
judges by involving them in the pretrial process. The concerns raised about the loss of efficiency
that can result from splitting tasks between the district judge and the magistrate judge are real,
but the solution lies not in creating a rigid either-or scheme but in teamwork and
communication between the judges when the pretrial activities are shared.
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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based on size or complexity and to have separate “tracks” with
different sets of rules geared toward the needs of the cases in those
tracks. In the end, the idea is to rely less on individual judges by doing
the tailoring at the front end when designing the rules rather than at
the back end through case-specific case management. The process of
designing differentiated rule schemes, however, raises its own array of
tricky problems.
1. Transsubstantivity and the One-Size-Fits-All Debate. Before
turning to the various proposals for differentiated rules, many of
which have been implemented in different forms in different
jurisdictions, I start with an overview of the federal Civil Rules system
as it currently stands. There is only one set of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Subject to a few exceptions, they apply to all civil actions
114
in the U.S. district courts. And there is only one form of action in
115
the district courts—“the civil action.” Add this up, and you get a
relatively simple picture: the same set of Civil Rules applies to all civil
cases in federal court, regardless of the size, complexity, or subject
matter of the case, or the dollar amount in controversy. This is no
116
accident. Rebelling against the headaches and costs caused by the
formalism of common law pleading, enamored of the flexibility and
simplicity of equity practice, and fortified by their belief that
procedure was merely the handmaiden of justice, the original drafters
of the Civil Rules consciously and deliberately set out to design a
117
single set of rules that could be applied to every case.
Procedural rules that apply to all types of cases are said to be
118
transsubstantive. The term does not exactly roll off the tongue, but
it is descriptive and neutral. A more colorful term is that the Civil
114. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a) (stating the rules’ applicability to particular
proceedings).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
116. Indeed, it may even have been inevitable. See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2010) (noting that the original drafters appear to have assumed,
given the nature of their task and the circumstances that led to the Rules Enabling Act, that the
rules they would be developing would apply uniformly to all cases).
117. For a history of the Rules Enabling Act, Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077
(2006), see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Tidmarsh, supra note 8.
118. The term “trans-substantive” was coined by Professor Robert Cover. See Robert M.
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718,
718 (1975).
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Rules are “one size fits all.” When used, that label usually is offered
in the spirit of criticism, not praise.
Critics of the transsubstantive design of the Civil Rules contend
that the cases that comprise the federal civil docket are too varied in
their needs to be handled effectively or efficiently by any single set of
120
rules. By trying to be all things for all cases, the critics argue, the
Civil Rules increase costs by imposing “Cadillac” procedures
designed for complex litigation on a docket populated mostly by
121
“Chevy” cases. The notion that there should be multiple sets of
rules pegged to different types or sizes of cases may be gaining steam
with the practicing bar. Nearly one-third of the respondents to the
ABA Section of Litigation Member Survey agreed with the
122
proposition that one set of rules cannot accommodate every case.
I think the one-size-fits-all description of the Civil Rules is inapt
and potentially misleading. It depicts the Civil Rules as a heavy wool
winter coat, size 48 long, that all civil cases are forced to wear
regardless of height, weight, or build, in all weather and all seasons. In
my mind, if one is to stick with the imagery of haberdashery, it is
more accurate to say that the Civil Rules are bespoke. Only pleadings
123
and initial disclosures are required. The rest is custom made. If the
parties so choose, or if the court—acting as tailor—so orders, the case
can get a breezy linen shirt instead of the heavy winter coat. Or, to
pursue the automotive metaphor, the Civil Rules are a showroom of
makes and models; it is ultimately up to the parties and the court to
determine whether they drive off in a Cadillac or a Chevy.
There lies the connection to case management. The process I just
described requires active and meaningful case management. Without
case management, the parties and their lawyers are free to do as they

119. E.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6;
Subrin, supra note 116, passim.
120. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6
(“Treating all cases in the same way results in under-management of some cases, overmanagement of others, and in both situations increased costs or delay, or both.”); Subrin, supra
note 116, at 388–93 (arguing that transsubstantive procedures waste time and money, reduce
focus and predictability, and tend to precipitate or force settlement).
121. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 563 (“The Cadillac process they enshrine helps to drive out of federal court those who
can afford only a Ford.”).
122. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 78, at 31 (showing that 38.6 percent of total
respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or “[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[o]ne set of Rules cannot
accommodate every case type”).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 26(a).
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124

like. Though some fixed limits do exist, the size of the pretrial
process is determined principally by how aggressively one or both
125
sides pursue discovery and engage in motion practice.
Metaphorically speaking, one side may want only the equivalent of a
light spring jacket but, as a result of the other party’s conduct or
demands, end up wearing a full-length wool coat. (To continue the
other metaphor, one side may think the case warrants only Chevylevel treatment but end up litigating it in Cadillac style, at Cadillac
prices.) The Civil Rules leave it to the individual judge to custom-fit
the procedure to the case. When people criticize the Civil Rules as
being one-size-fits-all, they are arguing—either explicitly or
implicitly—that federal judges lack the will or the ability to be good
case tailors.
Is that critique right? I think most supporters of the casemanagement approach would say that federal judges already have
ample tools to be good tailors, though the search for more and better
tools is ongoing. That being said, even the strongest supporters of
case management recognize that some judges are simply not making
good, or sufficiently frequent, use of the case-management tools they
126
do have. Indeed, one of the topics for the Duke Conference is to see
if we can identify ways to improve the effective use of those tools or
to identify more or better tools. But critics of the case-management
model would argue that the one-size-fits-all model suffers from flaws
that cannot be fixed by more or better case management or by an
expanded set of case-management tools. My sympathies lie with the
supporters of case management. I think the case-management model
does work, though I agree it can (and probably must) be improved.
At bottom, I think case management by judges, custom-fitting the
procedure in the case based on the options available under the Civil

124. See Marcus, supra note 19, at 1589 (2003) (“Without case management . . . lawyers
would be free of substantial constraint . . . .”).
125. Default numerical limits exist, for example, for depositions and for interrogatories. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (permitting no more than ten depositions per side); id. 30(d)(1)
(imposing a seven-hour limit on depositions); id. 33(a)(1) (permitting no more than twenty-five
interrogatories per pair of parties). While nothing in the Civil Rules limits the frequency or
number of dispositive motions, many districts have limitations in their local rules. See, e.g., W.D.
OKLA. LCVR 56.1(a) (permitting each party to file only one summary judgment motion without
the leave of the court).
126. See Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 11 (“The problem is an absence of will.”);
Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 231–32 (suggesting a need to “increase the use of the rules that are
already on the books”).
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Rules, remains our best strategy for seeing that cases receive the right
type and amount of procedure.
The purpose of this Section, however, is not to champion case
management as the best method for ensuring that each case receives a
type and degree of procedure best suited to its needs. Rather, it is to
explore alternative methods for doing so, to which I now turn.
2. Proposals for Differentiated Rules. This Section explores three
proposals for differentiated rules: (1) substance-specific procedures,
(2) tracking systems, and (3) simplified procedures. It is important to
make clear at the outset that these alternatives and case management
are not mutually exclusive. I do not think any of the proponents of
these options would urge that they should be adopted in lieu of—or
to the exclusion of—all forms of case management. Indeed, some
reform proposals call for abandoning the one-size-fits-all system,
adopting specialized schemes, and ratcheting up case management
127
within those specialized schemes. Nonetheless, there remains a
critical link between case-management reform and proposals for
differentiated-rule schemes: any proposal to solve cost and delay
issues by enhancing the case-management powers of the judge should
expect to answer to critics who believe that no amount of case
management can solve those issues if our starting point is a single set
of rules for all cases.
128

a. Substance-Specific Rules. The Rules Enabling Act says
surprisingly little about what the structure of the Civil Rules should
129
be. The only drafting norm stated in the Rules Enabling Act is that
130
the Civil Rules are to be “general.” A limited interpretation of that
directive might be that Congress intended only that the Rules be
geographically uniform—that is, that they would apply in all districts,

127. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6–9; AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra
note 80, at 4–5, 18–24.
128. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
129. See Steven S. Gensler, Justness! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to The Revolution
of 1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 267 (2008)
(“The text of the Rules Enabling Act yields no normative directives for drafting the Rules.”).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). The Rules Enabling Act does provide additional guidance, but it is
directed more toward scope and limits than norms or structure. For example, the rulemaking
authority is for rules of “practice and procedure.” Id. And, of course, the rules may not
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Id. § 2072(b).
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rejecting any continuing notion of conformity to state practice. By
132
and large, that is how the Civil Rules operate. But the original
drafters were not just seeking to displace conformity to state
procedure, and they were not just looking to ensure that federal
procedure would be geographically uniform. The goal from the start
was to develop a single set of rules that would apply to all cases
133
regardless of size or substance. The flexibility provided by modeling
this set of rules on equity practice would permit the parties and the
134
court to adjust them as needed and as applied.
Recent reform proposals recommend the creation of substancespecific rules. The IAALS, for example, writes that the “rulemakers
should be able to create different sets of rules for different types of
135
cases so they can be resolved more expeditiously and efficiently.” In
this regard, the IAALS finds itself in the company of some of the
136
most prominent procedure scholars of our time. Professor Subrin

131. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 542 (noting that the Advisory Committee seems to
have assumed that the Rules Enabling Act carried with it a directive to be transsubstantive and
not just geographically uniform).
132. The Civil Rules do incorporate some geographic variation. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
4(e) (incorporating state-law service methods); id. 17(b) (incorporating state-law standards on
the capacity to sue or be sued); id. 64 (incorporating state prejudgment remedies). A much more
significant source of interdistrict variation comes from local rules. See generally Stephen N.
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989). For a recent defense of local rules, at least
as compared to standing orders or other judge-specific practices, see Samuel P. Jordan, Local
Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
2010).
133. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 381–84 (noting the absence of any evidence suggesting
that there was any debate “about whether the rules would be uniform in the sense that the same
rules would apply to all cases”).
134. See id. at 384–86 (noting that scholars at the time of the Rules Enabling Act wanted
rules “as permissive and expansive as equity”); Subrin, supra note 117, at 922–25 (“The
expansive and flexible aspects of equity are all implicit in the Federal Rules.”).
135. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 80, at 4.
136. See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 333 (2008) (“[W]e must bury . . . the thoroughly misguided idea that transsubstantivity is an independent value or ideal for the Federal Rules.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Of
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 693, 715 (1988) (“[T]he trend of modern procedural law has been away from rules that
make policy choices towards those that confer on trial courts a substantial amount of normative
discretion.”); Cover, supra note 118, at 731–32 (arguing that, because procedural devices are
justified partially in terms of substantive objectives, the failure of the Civil Rules to promote
their substantive objectives in many cases is troubling); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547 (1986) (“We must face
that . . . we need to determine what subsets of cases require special kinds of rules, and write
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has long called for substance-specific rules on the basis that
transsubstantive rules require overly general directions and vague
137
standards that increase expense and decrease consistency. Professor
Stephen Burbank is also a longtime advocate of substance-specific
rules; he argues that substance-specific rules that provide more
detailed guidance—and additional constraints—are preferable to
138
transsubstantive rules that rely on judicial discretion.
Professor Robert Bone advocates substance-specific rules on the
basis that transsubstantive rules fail to account for differences in
139
substantive priorities. According to Bone, to promote the “just”
adjudication of claims in a world where resource limits make perfect
accuracy in all cases impossible, the Civil Rules should be designed to
resolve the most important substantive policies with the greatest
140
accuracy. As an example, Bone suggests that, because cases
involving constitutional issues or bodily harm are, relatively speaking,
more important than cases involving property, special rule provisions
might be developed to minimize the risk of error in the former
141
categories of cases.
Most recently, he has argued that
transsubstantive pleading rules misfire because they do not
adequately account for substantive areas in which the parties face

rules for those kinds of cases.”); Subrin, supra note 92, at 45–56 (making a case for selective
substance-specific procedure); Subrin, supra note 132, at 2048–51 (“When one begins to define
procedures more rigorously, it becomes obvious that some cases need different rules.”).
137. See Subrin, supra note 92, at 45–56 (making a case for selective substance-specific
procedure); see also Subrin, supra note 116, at 404–05 (discussing substance-specific protocols).
138. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 556–64 (“Growing awareness that questions of ‘mere
procedure’ may implicate important social policy encourages those who cannot make an
independent judgment to have only so much confidence in the integrity of the process and the
quality of the legal products it produces as they do in the actors who control it.”); see also
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1936–37 (1989) (suggesting that empirical data and objective
guidance are more likely to lead to “equal justice” than is the discretion of judges).
139. See Bone, supra note 136, at 333–34 (“The fact that substantive policy is always part of
procedural justification means that trans-substantivity as an independent value or ideal makes
no sense at all.”).
140. See id. (“[T]he cost as well as the risk of error matters, and error cost is measured in
terms of the substantive policies at stake.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A
Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 302–05 (2010) (arguing that the
goal of procedure should be to achieve an optimal distribution of error risks and that an optimal
distribution should take into account the substantive interests underlying different subjects of
the law).
141. See Bone, supra note 140, at 303; Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 936
(1999).
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significant information asymmetries. Thus, Bone might propose
different pleading standards for antitrust actions than for breach-ofcontract actions given that plaintiffs typically have presuit access to
the key facts in the latter but not the former.
The debate is hardly one-sided, however. An equally prominent
group of procedure scholars think that the benefits of
143
transsubstantive rules outweigh their costs. Professor Geoffrey
Hazard urges us to remember that one of the virtues of
transsubstantive procedural rules is that developments in a rule from
one type of case can be employed in other types of cases, allowing for
144
the development of new types of socially beneficial litigation.
Professor Carrington warns against the politics that substance-specific
rules would interject into the rulemaking process, concluding that the
task of creating special rules for particular types of cases is properly
145
left to Congress. Professor Rick Marcus has embraced both
146
points.
The transsubstantivity debate has important implications for case
management. Without the ability to customize the pretrial process via
case management, it is doubtful that a single set of rules could service
all cases across all subject areas. Indeed, many advocates of

142. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 936 (2009) (calling for substance-specific rules in the types of cases that most
seriously involve meritless filings—such as those with significant informational asymmetries—
because transsubstantive rules cannot account for the various cost-benefit tradeoffs at stake in
different types of cases).
143. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074–87 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and TransSubstantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47
(1989); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 415–26 (2010); Marcus, supra note 1, at 776–79.
144. See Hazard, supra note 143, at 2247 (“The Federal Rules have been employed in ‘social
justice’ litigation precisely because they are cast in general terms, rather than tailored to specific
types of litigation.”).
145. See Carrington, supra note 143, at 2074–75 (listing reasons for pursuing the ideal of
“perfect neutrality in the rulemaking process [and] in the procedure rules themselves”); Paul D.
Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J.
597, 617, 661 (2010) (asserting that “special rules for a substantive category of cases . . . would
be a task for Congress” and that “since the mid-1980s . . . the Supreme Court’s revisions of the
Civil Rules have [had] a clearly visible political aim”).
146. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 778–79 (noting that “[a] shift away from trans-substantive
procedures” would “eliminate the positive effect of applying procedural learning from one
substantive area to another” and “constrict[] the focus on the winners and losers in such a way
as to magnify the likelihood that those with greater power will be the winners”).
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substance-specific rules articulate the relationship in reverse, saying
that customized case management by the judge renders the rules
147
transsubstantive in name only. What is undeniably true is that there
is an inverse relationship between substance-specific rules and case
management. Defenders of transsubstantivity say we do not need
substance-specific rules because judges can customize via case
management. Advocates of substance-specific rules respond that we
would not need so much customized case management if we had
more customized rules. Thus, any reform proposal that would give
judges more case-management power as a means of allowing for even
greater case customization must be prepared to answer to the critics
who think that those distinctions should be reduced to rule text.
That being said, we must be careful not to paint this debate as
presenting a strictly binary choice between pure rule
transsubstantivity and substance-based rule balkanization. Fidelity to
the principle of transsubstantivity is, for all practical purposes, a
148
question of degree. I am not aware of any scholar who seriously
argues that we should have separate rules for every different subject.
The flaws in that approach were made clear under the common-law
149
writ system, which nobody I know of thinks should be revived.
Moreover, the court-made rules already depart from pure
150
transsubstantivity in two ways. First, we already have special sets of
court-made rules for some categories of proceedings; special rules
151
152
already exist for habeas corpus cases, for admiralty proceedings,

147. See Burbank, supra note 136, at 715 (“Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that
in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by trial judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive
in only the most trivial sense.” (citing Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1463, 1473–74 (1987) (book review))); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 527 (1986) (“[T]he emergence of managerial
judging . . . exemplif[ies] ad hoc efforts to tailor rules to individual cases.”); Silberman, supra
note 109, at 2176 (“[B]y and large the erosion of trans-substantive rules has come via ad hoc
informal, customized procedures devised by judges . . . .”).
148. Gensler, supra note 129, at 267.
149. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 388 (“Those who cherish transsubstantive procedure are
right that we do not want to return to anything like the writ system, even if we could.”).
150. Congress, of course, remains free to displace, modify, or embellish the transsubstantive,
court-made rules with specific statutory provisions. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2006) (instituting heightened pleading requirements in
securities fraud cases).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts (2006) (implementing special rules for cases involving petitions for writs of habeas
corpus).
152. FED. R. CIV. P. A–F (providing supplemental Rules for admiralty or maritime claims).
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and, most recently, for civil forfeiture cases. Second, we already
have some substance-specific provisions within the generally
transsubstantive Civil Rules. Rule 26 exempts some categories of
154
cases from mandatory disclosures. Rule 9 provides substance155
dependent pleading standards. And Rule 23.1 is explicitly limited to
156
shareholder derivative actions.
As a basic principle, I strongly support having a single set of rules
that applies to all cases. In particular, I agree with those
commentators who think that the decision whether to have special
rules for particular substantive areas (such as special rules for
157
antitrust actions or civil rights actions) is best left to Congress. At
the same time, one must acknowledge that some precedent for
departures from transsubstantivity does exist. It also must be
acknowledged that proposals to add a few discrete substance-specific
rule provisions here and there, fitted within the generally
transsubstantive rules framework, raise much different questions than
would, for example, a proposal to adopt wholly separate rule schemes
158
for tort cases, contract cases, and civil rights cases.

153. Id. G (providing a supplemental Rule for in rem forfeiture actions).
154. Id. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting nine types of proceedings).
155. Id. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud be pleaded with particularity).
156. Id. 23.1.
157. This is not to say that I support direct rulemaking by Congress. Court rulemaking
through the existing rulemaking process still represents the best method for tapping into the
widest range of expertise, for gathering empirical data, and for careful study of the issues. See
Bone, supra note 141, at 938 (“Because the process requires rulemakers to infer general
principles from practice, it is much better suited to the courts than to the legislature.”); Richard
Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 313–14 (2008) (praising the federal rulemaking
process as “institutionalized and highly expert” as well as “independent and relatively
apolitical”). Rather, it is simply to say that I do not find in the current Rules Enabling Act
scheme any clear warrant to make broad departures from the transsubstantive model or from
the normative benchmark of crafting rules to achieve the “just, speedy, and efficient”
adjudication of all claims. See Gensler, supra note 129, at 268 (“[O]ne finds little to suggest that
Congress equated the goal of justness in the rules with a rulemaking process driven by
normative metrics, the policy values underlying substantive laws, or the distribution of error
costs . . . .”). Should Congress conclude that departures from the transsubstantive model are
warranted, however, Congress can send that signal with legislation that provides more detailed
instructions to the rulemakers or by engaging in a cooperative rulemaking process with the goal
of producing rule changes that would be enacted legislatively. See id. at 262 n.28 (discussing the
cooperative process between Congress and the rulemakers that led to the development and
enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502).
158. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 542 (distinguishing “wholly different procedural
regimes for different bodies of substantive law” from “altering only discrete Federal Rules, or
portions thereof, that do not satisfactorily implement the policies underlying a body of
substantive law or a particular scheme of substantive rights”).
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b. Case Tracking. Tracking is another reform proposal that
competes, at least in part, with the case-management model. The idea
of tracking is simple and sensible. Different cases have different
needs. Rather than leaving it up to the judge to tailor the procedure
to the needs of the case, the Civil Rules would create tracks with
different sets of procedures. Then it would just be a matter of putting
each case on the right track. The purpose of tracking is cost control.
While tracking schemes may include complex-case tracks that come
with extra procedure, the principal focus invariably is to create
simple-case tracks (or “fast” tracks) that offer less procedure. For this
reason, I like to think of tracking schemes as being akin to kids’
159
menus at restaurants. The kids get to eat (that is, litigants are not
denied access to pretrial procedure). But their options are limited,
and the portions are reduced—as is, we expect, the price.
Tracking has a very respectable pedigree. In its 1990 report, the
Federal Courts Study Committee expressed interest in case tracking,
though it quickly added that “more study is needed to learn whether
tracking or much more individualized case management is generally
160
preferable for the federal civil caseload.” When Congress passed
161
the CJRA that same year, one of the six main reform principles to
be considered by each district was the “systematic, differential
162
treatment of civil cases.” While many districts opted to continue to
rely on individual judges to provide case tailoring, a number of
163
districts adopted tracking systems, at least nominally. Tracking
continues to have strong support in some quarters. Several districts

159. See Steven S. Gensler, Procedure a la Carte, Presentation at Association of American
Law Schools Annual Meeting, Section on Civil Procedure Program (Jan. 8, 2010).
160. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 57, at 100.
161. CJRA, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (2006). See generally James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth,
Laural A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Just,
Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice
Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 20 (1997) (listing the case-management principles of the
CJRA).
163. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 30 (1996) (listing
methods of differential case management adopted by pilot and comparison districts); DAVID
RAUMA & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLANS: A SOURCEBOOK 83–103 (1995) (listing differential
case-management plans for all districts).
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retain tracking mechanisms in their local rules. The IAALS
165
endorses tracking. Professor Miller recently indicated interest in
166
exploring tracking.
For a comparative perspective, we might look to England, which
established a case tracking system in 1998 as part of the Woolf
167
Reforms. The English system has three tracks: small-claims track,
168
fast track, and multi-track. The small-claims track is the normal
track for most cases in which the value of the claim is less than
169
£5,000. The fast track is the normal track for most cases in which the
170
value of the claim is between £5,000 and £25,000. All other cases
171
normally are placed on the multi-track. But these track-allocation
criteria are not determinative. Ultimately, the judge makes the trackallocation decision based on both the general allocation scheme and a
172
list of case-specific factors. The judge may also reallocate a case to a
173
different track at a later time.
While tracking makes sense in theory, in the federal courts it has
174
proven problematic in implementation. It does work at the margins.

164. See, e.g., N.D. GA. CIV. R. 26.2.A (assigning cases to one of three discovery tracks
based on subject matter); S.D. IND. R. 16.1(b) (incorporating a case-management plan that
requires the parties to select from one of four tracks); N.D. & S.D. MISS. CIV. R. 1 (creating six
case-management tracks: Expedited, Standard, Complex, Administrative, Mass Tort, and
Suspension); M.D.N.C. CIV. R. 26.1(a) (creating three discovery tracks: Standard, Complex, and
Exceptional); N.D. OHIO R. 16.2 (creating five case-management tracks: Expedited, Standard,
Complex, Administrative, and Mass Torts).
165. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 7
(“Judges should develop a differentiated case management system that includes simplified
procedure for some cases and more intricate procedure for other kinds of cases.”).
166. See Miller, supra note 4, at 120 (“Tracking—at least in some form—is an idea whose
time may have come.”).
167. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR
ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 13–102 (1996) (proposing and
detailing a system of judicial case management).
168. CPR, (2006) pt. 26.1(2) (U.K.). For a more thorough discussion of England’s tracking
scheme, see STUART SIME, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 210–13 (12th ed.
2009).
169. CPR 26.6(1)–(3).
170. Id. 26.6(4)–(5) (excluding cases in which trial is likely to last more than one day and
cases with extensive expert evidence).
171. Id. 26.6(6).
172. Id. 26.7 (providing the general rule for allocation); id. 26.8 (listing matters relevant to
track allocation). In cases involving claims with no financial value, the court simply selects the
track it considers most suitable. See id. 26.7(2).
173. Id. 26.10.
174. The development of tracking systems in state courts presents a much different situation
because of differences in the cases that populate the state court docket. For example, it is almost
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For example, federal courts have long tracked certain types of cases
like social security appeals and student loan collections that, for
various reasons, either do not fit or do not need the general pretrial
175
scheme. But that is the low-hanging fruit; even without tracking,
courts would have (and have had) little trouble determining the
proper level of procedure in those contexts. In order to add real
value, a tracking system would have to take the general population of
cases and efficiently sort those cases into separate groups that
accurately and fairly reflect the amount of procedure appropriate to
the cases in each group. More specifically, because the principal goal
of tracking is to reduce cost and delay by identifying “simple” cases
that can be processed using downsized or streamlined procedures, the
real challenge is to develop a tracking system that can sift the
176
“simple” cases out of the general docket.
Efforts to create simple-case tracks in federal court have not
fared well. One of the essential elements of a successful tracking
system is that each track must be used with sufficient frequency to
177
justify its existence. In federal court, however, it has proved difficult
to create meaningful simple-case tracks because of heated
disagreements about how to define a significant population of federal
a given that a state will have special rules, if not a special court, for small-claims cases. In
addition, some states have had success using tracking techniques in particular subject-matter
areas. See Lande, supra note 68, at 97–98 (“Studies have found that in family courts using DCM
systems, disputes were resolved more quickly, the number of court hearings and the amount of
repeat litigation were reduced, and, most importantly, the percentage of highly distressed
children was reduced.”).
175. See COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 130–31 (“Many
districts include an automatic track assignment process for certain types of cases. Administrative
or appeals cases, such as Social Security or bankruptcy appeals, are identified by their pleadings
and are automatically assigned to the administrative/appeals track.”); KAKALIK ET AL., supra
note 163, at 45 (noting “special procedures for certain types of cases that have traditionally
required only minimal management—typically prisoner petitions, Social Security appeals,
government loan recovery cases, and bankruptcy appeals”). Moreover, the Civil Rules perform
a form of tracking for these types of cases by excepting them from various pretrial requirements.
See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.
176. Comparatively, it is easier to identify the complex cases. See JAMES S. KAKALIK,
TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS
M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 49 (1996) (“Cases at either extreme of the complexity
spectrum are relatively easy to fit into a track.”). But the value of identifying these cases is
comparatively less because the result is typically to flag the case for more individualized
attention, not less.
177. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT:
IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 16 (1993) (listing as an assessment criterion that “[e]ach of the
DCM tracks is used with sufficient frequency to justify its existence”).
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court cases for a simple-case track. There is little point in creating a
simple-case track if we cannot identify very many cases to put on it.
The search for candidates for the simple-case track in the federal
docket raises a critical and difficult question: what features make a
case appropriate for the simplified or streamlined procedures
associated with the simple-case track?
One method might be to use the amount in controversy as a
proxy for whether a case is simple. In England, for example, the
small-claims track and the fast track are based principally on the
amount in controversy, set at £5,000 and £25,000 respectively. If we
take just the fast-track limit and assume a two-dollars-to-one-pound
conversion rate, we get an amount in controversy of $50,000. So,
perhaps all cases in which the amount in controversy is less than
178
$50,000 might be assigned to the simple-case track. That scheme,
however, would capture no diversity jurisdiction cases, given that
diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy of more than
179
$75,000. This result illustrates a somewhat obvious but nonetheless
critical point: the types of cases placed in simple-case or fast tracks in
other systems often do not exist in the federal docket because of the
limits of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
A tracking scheme that allocated cases with an amount in
controversy of less than $50,000 likely would capture many federal
question cases, given that there is no minimum amount in controversy
180
for federal question jurisdiction. But many of those low-dollar cases
might be complex or have a social or policy value that exceeds the
damages at stake. Might not many of those cases warrant access to the
standard set of procedures, subject to individual case-tailoring by the
181
judge? For that reason, Professor Subrin has endorsed a mechanism

178. Coincidentally (I assume), that was also the amount-in-controversy threshold that
Professor Ed Cooper used when he experimented with drafting simplified rules in his capacity
as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified
Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1805 (2002) (adopting $50,000 as the
general threshold for application of “simplified rules”).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
180. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1797 (“Looking at all cases filed in federal courts from
1989 through 1998 . . . [the FJC] found that information about a stated money demand greater
than $0 was available for only 610,002 [cases], less than 28%. Of this reduced set of cases,
236,212 involved demands from $1 to $50,000.”).
181. To continue the comparison to the English tracking scheme, factors relevant to putting
a case into a different track include “the likely complexity of the facts, law or evidence” and
“the importance of the claim to persons who are not parties to the proceedings.” CPR, (2006)
pt. 26.8(1) (U.K.). According to Professor Sime, “cases involving issues of public importance”
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that would exempt federal question cases in which “Congress has
revealed a desire for energetic enforcement . . . by providing for
182
multiple damages or fee shifting for successful plaintiffs.” But if one
took out all of the federal question cases that had multiple damages
or fee-shifting, what would be left for the simple-case track?
Moreover, of the federal question cases that remained candidates
for the simple-case track, how many of those would one consider
“over-procedured” under the current federal pretrial scheme? Rule
26(a)(1)(B) already exempts many of the more simple federal
183
question cases from the required initial disclosures. Rule 26(f)
exempts these same cases from the discovery-planning conference
184
and report requirements. And Rule 16(b)(1) allows districts to
enact local rules exempting categories of cases from the scheduling185
order requirements. In sum, the Civil Rules already take steps to
relieve a wide range of cases from various pretrial burdens, further
shrinking the universe of federal question cases that are in need of a
simple-case track to unsaddle them from the demands of the federal
pretrial scheme.
If we redefine the target population as federal question cases
that (1) have a low amount in controversy, (2) are currently subject to
the full range of the federal pretrial process, and (3) do not otherwise
present social or policy matters justifying the full pretrial process, we
would then need to ask at least three questions. First, what types of
cases comprise that population? Second, do we have solid empirical
data to show that this population of cases is associated with high
levels of discovery or motion practice? And third, even if those levels
are high, are they unduly high or are they warranted? In each such
case, at least one of the parties must think the discovery or motion
186
practice is warranted. Returning to the overarching question of
are usually allocated to the multi-track even if the amount in controversy is below £25,000.
SIME, supra note 168, at 212–13.
182. Subrin, supra note 116, at 400 (footnote omitted).
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting “simple” federal question cases like “an action
for review on an administrative record” and “an action . . . to collect on a student loan”).
184. Id. 26(f)(1).
185. Id. 16(b)(1). It is my understanding that many districts create scheduling-order
exemptions for the types of cases that are exempt from initial disclosures and discovery
planning.
186. It is possible, of course, for the parties to engage in excessive pretrial activities even if
neither thinks it is necessary. On the other hand, if the parties agree that the case needs only
minimal pretrial activities, they can achieve that without being placed in a restricted track. They
can restrain themselves individually, they can communicate and cooperatively agree to conduct
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what gains can be made by formal case-tracking, is the population of
cases that fit the three criteria above large enough to warrant
developing and operating a system-wide tracking system as opposed
to relying on individual case management?
Alternatively, we could expand the population of candidates for
the simple-case track by including diversity cases with an amount in
controversy of some amount between $75,000 and some not-too-high
187
figure—say, for example, $250,000. I assume that such a scheme
would capture a significant number of diversity suits, though it would
trigger inevitable application questions, such as whether to include
the value of counterclaims, how to value nonmonetary claims, and the
effect of amendments that raise the amount in controversy above the
188
simple-case-track threshold. The drafting of such a scheme would
require considerable care to avoid rewarding gamesmanship or
creating loopholes that could be exploited. Our experience with
amount-in-controversy disputes in the removal context should raise
some legitimate concern that lawyers might try to game a tracking
189
system pegged to the amount in controversy. We would also need to
consider whether the benefits of providing a simple-case track for
those cases (compared with the benefits of case-tailoring) justify the
inevitable costs of creating the scheme and superintending the
allocation of cases to the tracks. And, as a final policy alternative, one
might even question whether it would be better to raise the amountin-controversy requirement to $250,000 (or whatever threshold we

minimal pretrial activities, and, if they want the court’s force behind their views (to prevent
defection), they can communicate their views to the judge (via the Rule 26(f) discovery planning
report and at the Rule 16 scheduling conference if there is one) and have the judge incorporate
those limits into the case-management order. Id. 16, 26(f).
187. Professor Subrin suggests using as a target “realistic damages of over $500,000.” Subrin,
supra note 116, at 400. I have no trouble with the figure he uses; any figure would draw an
artificial line. It is not immediately clear to me, however, how a clerk of court, or even a judge,
would determine what damages were “realistic” at the start of the suit or without
communication with the parties, which then would cross back into the realm of judge-driven,
differentiated case management.
188. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 178, at 1805–08 (elaborating a scheme that attempts to
address many of these issues).
189. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in
Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial
and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV.
681, 686 (1997) (“Jurisdictional dilemmas arise in removal cases under two basic scenarios: (1)
cases involving an indeterminate complaint . . . and (2) cases involving a ‘lowball’
complaint . . . .”).
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would set for the simple-case track) and leave those “simple” cases in
190
state court in the first place.
Even if there were sufficient numbers of “simple” cases in the
federal system to justify a system-wide case-tracking scheme, that
scheme would require effective allocation criteria. “The success of
[tracking] is based in large measure on whether cases are correctly
191
evaluated and assigned to the case-management tracks.” Experience
has shown, however, that the types of objective data typically
available at the start of the case—such as the stated amount in
controversy or the nature of the suit as indicated by the plaintiff in
the civil cover sheet—often are not very good predictors of how
192
expensive the case will be or how long it will take. This does not
make a tracking system inherently nonviable, but it does mean that
informed tracking decisions will require court personnel (probably,
but not necessarily, a judge) to elicit and consider additional
193
information about the case. To the extent a judge performs this
task, one might question the value of the tracking system. It would
seem to require essentially the same level of judicial resources as

190. The policy questions about whether to retain diversity jurisdiction and, if so, where to
set the amount-in-controversy requirement are well-known to this group and beyond the scope
of this Article. Several authors have suggested specific reforms. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., supra note 58, at 29–32 (recommending measures “to seek reduction in the number of
federal court proceedings in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship”); 1 FED.
COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 13, at 454–58 (recommending “abolition of general diversity
jurisdiction” with three exceptions: suits involving aliens, interpleader, and complex multistate
litigation); AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 12–14 (1969) (proposing amendments that would restrict diversity
jurisdiction). For an overview of the arguments for and against diversity jurisdiction, see Larry
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 101–21 (providing an overview of the
arguments for and against diversity jurisdiction). I do note that a proposal developed by the
Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee is the subject of a bill pending in Congress that would
provide for automatic increases to the amount-in-controversy requirement, in $5,000
increments, by indexing increases to the Consumer Price Index. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction
and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th Cong. § 103.
191. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 130; see also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 177, at 16–17 (listing “[t]rack assignment” as a “Critical DCM
Function[]”).
192. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 163, at 46 (acknowledging “the difficulty in
determining the correct track assignment for most civil litigation cases using data available at or
soon after case filing”); Kakalik et al., supra note 162, at 28 (noting that “there was little actual
‘differential’ tracking of general civil cases in most districts that adopted a track model in their
CJRA plan”).
193. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 163, at 49 (noting that even among the districts that
adopted tracking systems, the majority of cases were tracked the same way, possibly alleviating
very little judge involvement).
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individual case-tailoring, thereby undermining one of the purposes of
194
a systematic tracking scheme. But if the judge did no more than
assign the case to a track, which still treats cases on a modified
wholesale basis, the payoff would be less than if the judge had
entered a custom-tailored case-management order.
That point raises the more general point that tracking systems
typically do not eliminate the need for judges to make case-by-case
decisions about the needs of any particular case. Tracking system
proposals typically either place the tracking decision with the judge
initially or give the court authority to move cases from one track to
195
another. They also typically allow the judge to alter the procedural
196
restrictions applicable to a particular track. These powers would
seem appropriate—if not necessary—to deal with situations in which
the allocation criteria would yield a track assignment that was a poor
fit for the particular case. But it interjects the trial court back into the
process, with the tracking system operating not as a fixed rule but as a
default. As Professor Maurice Rosenberg has noted, the success of
tracking systems comes to depend on “skillful judicial case
197
management.” That, in turn, raises the question of whether tracking
with judicial tailoring works any better than having judges conduct
differential case management (DCM) on a discretionary case-by-case
basis by tailoring their scheduling orders.
Proponents of tracking have suggested two reasons why tracking
198
is beneficial even if it requires significant judicial involvement.

194. See COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 130 (“[U]nlike case
management approaches that treat each case on an entirely individual basis, [tracking] provides
systematic recognition of differences in case types and thus tries to conserve court resources by
systematically tailoring their application.”).
195. See id. at 130–31 (detailing several common options for DCM track-assignment
procedures); see also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at
6 (noting that DCM systems with automated screening processes still require judges for
reallocation); Cooper, supra note 178, at 1805 (noting that “simplified rules” do not apply “if the
court, on motion or on its own, finds good cause to proceed under the regular rules”); Subrin,
supra note 116, at 400 (including in his “simple track” proposal “a provision that for very good
cause shown a party could move to be removed from the simple track”).
196. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 131 (“[A]ll DCM systems
preserve the discretion of the assigned judge to alter the previously chosen track or any of its
predefined management controls as individual case needs evolve.”).
197. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 2212.
198. In the past, tracking systems were also said to promote the ability of courts to
automatically track case progress to ensure that cases did not “fall through the cracks” of
individualized case management. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at
130. With the introduction of the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system
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Professor Subrin argues that tracking is better because it replaces a
199
wholly ad hoc process with some standardization. Professor John
Lande makes a similar point, saying that tracking provides structure
200
to the differential case-management process. He also suggests that
tracking sends a special signal to the parties about the court’s
201
expectations for the case.
One could hardly contest the idea that like cases should be
handled in like fashion, or that it is good for judges to clearly
communicate their expectations to the litigants. The proposition that
tracking achieves these virtues better than individual case
management is, for me, not an obvious one. I can think of no clearer
way for a judge to communicate his or her expectations of the parties
than to hold a meaningful case-management conference and issue a
detailed,
custom-tailored
case-management
order.
The
standardization argument is harder to assess. It is no doubt true that
judges vary in their case management. A tracking scheme, if it were
consistently followed, would likely increase uniformity. But the main
purpose of a tracking system is to match cases with their real
procedural needs. If the system is to be limited to a manageable
number of tracks, the match will always be a rough one because cases
that are not exactly the same will be lumped together. Thus, the
benefit of uniformity that comes from the standardized treatment of
similar cases comes at the price of ignoring differences between the
cases that individual case-tailoring could address. In other words, in
the effort to stop the mismatches and disparities that might result
from what Professor Subrin calls ad hoc case-tailoring, we might

in federal courts, however, I assume that districts or individual judges have ample tools at their
disposal to monitor case progress across the docket.
199. Subrin, supra note 116, at 401.
200. Lande, supra note 68, at 95 (“DCM builds on the process of individual case
management by providing structure and expectations for the courts, attorneys, and litigants.”);
see also DONNA STIENSTRA, MOLLY JOHNSON & PATRICIA LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at iii, 14–15 (1997) (discussing survey results from
districts selected by Congress as demonstration districts due to their receptivity to case
management and alternative dispute resolution and instructed to demonstrate how to make the
techniques listed in the CJRA work).
201. Lande, supra note 68, at 95; see also STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 200, at 14 (“[DCM]
informs the attorneys about the judges’ expectations for cases of various types, and
consequently attorneys are better prepared to discuss the case realistically at the first case
management conference.”).
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sacrifice the perfect matches that custom case-tailoring delivers when
done well.
In the end, the CJRA experiment failed to provide much
meaningful data on whether tracking systems could efficiently, fairly,
or uniformly perform the differential case management of civil cases
in federal court. In large part, this is because too few districts and
judges utilized it often enough to provide a data set sufficient to
202
support empirically valid conclusions. Of the ten pilot districts that
were required to implement DCM, four of them rejected tracking and
203
continued to rely on individual case management. Of the six pilot
districts that adopted tracking systems, most of them either failed to
use them or assigned virtually all of their cases to the “standard”
204
track.
Because of the paucity of data, the RAND report declined to
draw any conclusions about the potential for tracking to reduce cost
205
and delay in the federal courts. We are left, then, to speculate about
why the CJRA tracking experiment failed. One conclusion might be
that, outside of the easy pickings like administrative appeals and
student loan cases, there simply are not many cases that both qualify
for federal subject-matter jurisdiction and do not warrant the
application of general procedure. Alternatively, it may be that we just
cannot identify these cases based on the information available at or
near the time of filing. Either of these reasons would severely
undermine the value of a tracking system in federal court. On the
other hand, the results of the CJRA experiment may simply show that
the federal judiciary, which did not like being told by Congress how
to do its job, simply dug in its heels and never gave tracking a fighting
206
chance.
In its Final Report to Congress on the CJRA, the Judicial
Conference enthusiastically endorsed the notion of DCM but
recommended that the choice between tracking and individual-judge

202. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 402. Professor Subrin raises this point to deflect the
argument that case tracking under the CJRA was not validated empirically, concluding that it
was “[t]he failure of Federal District Court Judges to permit empirical study of tracking” that
caused the data gap. Id.
203. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 163, at 45.
204. Id. at 49.
205. Id. at 45–46.
206. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 402 (“The failure of Federal District Court Judges to
permit empirical study of tracking makes the argument of adopting a simple track system only
after empirical study all the more hollow.”).
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207

discretion be left to each district. The Judicial Conference explained
that “[m]any courts found that it is easier and less bureaucratic for
individual judges to establish individual DCM schedules based on the
208
characteristics of cases.” Of course, the fact that judges prefer to
tailor cases according to their own judging styles or according to their
own views of the needs of those cases does not prove that tracking is
an inferior method of differentiating cases. One might view the
preferences of judges as reflecting a valid but as-yet-unconfirmed
intuition that tailoring is better done ex post by judges than ex ante
by committees. A less charitable view might be that it evidences
nothing more than that judges prefer doing things their own way
whenever they can.
c. Simplified Rules. The final alternative to a single set of
transsubstantive rules is to create a set of simplified rules for “simple”
cases. This alternative is essentially a variant of the tracking system
reduced to two tracks. It responds most directly to the
“Cadillac/Chevy” problem, operating on the premise that we can
keep the Cadillac rules so long as we also have a set of Chevy rules
for all of the “simple” cases. As the IAALS put it, the one-size-fits-all
approach of the Civil Rules “is bloated and has no scaled-down
209
version for cases demanding less expenditure.” There does appear
to be significant interest in the notion of simplified rules, including at
the federal level. Professor Subrin remains a vocal proponent of
210
creating a simple-case track in the federal court system. In the FJC’s
Civil Rules Survey, over 60 percent of the respondents either agreed
or strongly agreed with the proposition that the federal courts should
211
test simplified rules (with party consent) in a few select districts.
Several years ago, Professor Ed Cooper, Reporter for the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, prepared a draft of what a set of
simplified rules might look like. In his version, the hallmarks of
simplified procedure were more-detailed pleading, increased
212
disclosure obligations, and reduced discovery.
Others have

207. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 28 (recommending that each
district select either “the more rigid track model or the judicial discretion model”).
208. Id. at 27.
209. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6.
210. Subrin, supra note 116, at 398–405.
211. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 54.
212. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1796 (“The draft proposes more detailed pleading,
enhanced disclosure obligations, and restricted discovery opportunities.”).
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suggested that simplified procedure should also reduce or eliminate
213
judicial case management.
The fate of simplified rules is linked closely to the fate of broader
214
tracking systems, at least in the federal system. How many “Chevy”
cases are there in the federal system? What criteria do we use to
215
identify them? Do we create a mechanism to opt back into the
“Cadillac” rules? Can a party do that unilaterally? Is judicial action
required? And, ultimately, is there any reason to think that, in the
aggregate, we can get a better fit at a better price by implementing a
slotting mechanism than we can get by bespoke tailoring from a single
set of rules via individual case management? Professor Cooper notes
this issue in his article exploring the draft simplified rules:
Even if there is reason to fear that general federal procedure should
not apply in all its sweep to every case in federal court, it is not clear
that “general federal procedure” is as procrustean as the champions
of simplified procedure may claim. The Civil Rules provide many
opportunities for tailoring procedure to the realistic needs of
216
individual actions.

213. See Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and
Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 176 (2007) (suggesting “more detailed pleading,
mandatory disclosure, reduced discovery, reduced or no judicial case management (including
conferences), time limits on discovery and motions, and firm trial dates”); Subrin, supra note
116, at 399 (advocating limiting discovery, eliminating multiple pretrial conferences, and setting
a firm trial date).
214. The story in the state court systems might be much different. First, states already
employ this technique with small claims courts. Second, state courts of general jurisdiction
presumably will have a large number of cases that have lower monetary stakes and that do not
implicate civil rights or present other policy issues that might justify litigation under the full set
of rules.
215. One way of eliminating the problem of selecting cases for a “fast track” is to have an
optional system that the parties must opt for if they wish to use it. See Richard McMillan, Jr. &
David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431, 431 (1985) (calling for “a faster track judicial system—which
takes the basic principles of the ADR movement, i.e., that parties can voluntarily agree to much
less costly procedures for resolving disputes if given the opportunity, and applies such principles
to traditional court-supervised litigation”). One might fairly question the need for an optional
“fast track”; the parties can create their own “fast track” by simply agreeing to limit their
pretrial activities and to move quickly. As McMillan and Siegel note, however, that process
requires the parties to agree on many things over a long period of time, whereas an optional
“fast track” would only require them to agree once. Id. at 439 (“They need not negotiate the
procedures by which that compromise will be achieved; judicial rules are already in place.”).
216. Cooper, supra note 178, at 1798.
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3. The Path Forward. I do not know of anyone who thinks that
every case should get exactly the same pretrial procedure—that is,
that every case warrants the same amount of time for discovery, the
same amount and range of discovery, and so on. Put another way,
nobody thinks that the Advisory Committee should develop a single,
fixed playbook of scripted procedures to be applied mechanically and
without alteration to all cases, from the most complex antitrust class
action to the most pedestrian slip-and-fall diversity case. Different
cases will continue to have different pretrial needs.
The current Civil Rules scheme attempts to achieve that kind of
differentiation. It does so, despite having the same general set of rules
for all cases, by providing options for the parties and by empowering
trial courts to custom-fit the pretrial process to the needs of the case.
In that respect, I reject the “one-size-fits-all” label, which fails to
account for the tailoring that judges do. “One set of rules” does not
mean “one size fits all” when the set of rules in question provides
ample management options.
That being said, there is nothing in the Rules Enabling Act that
dictates that we have only one set of rules in federal court. We can
have different rules for different subjects (though subject-specific
rules would present their own questions under the Rules Enabling
Act and certainly would interject a new dimension of politics into the
217
rulemaking process). We can create different tracks for cases with
different characteristics. Some districts already have them under their
local rules. We can adopt the lesser form of tracking by creating a
separate set of simplified rules for some set of “simple” cases. All of
these options could still include case management for further custom
tailoring. The objective of these options is not to eliminate case
management completely but to become less dependent on it.
I think it is fair to say that everyone agrees that federal judges
could do a better job of utilizing their current case-management
powers. But before asking (or demanding) that they do so, we must
first pause to consider, again, whether the system should rely less on
case management, not more. If the answer is that the system should
be less dependent on case management, then some type of departure
from the “one set of rules” scheme would seem to be required. At the
same time, I think the burden is squarely on those who would depart
from the “one set of rules” model to show that the structures they

217. See supra notes 128–34, 145–46 and accompanying text.
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would emplace would do a better job of fitting the procedure to the
case than judges currently can do with their tailors’ tools.
C. Do Federal Judges Wield Too Much Discretion?
In general, the Civil Rules rely heavily on judicial discretion, and
the case-management rules are no exception. This is particularly true
with respect to discovery management, in which district judges wield
wide discretionary power to regulate the scope, sequence, timing, and
methods of discovery. This Section addresses the concern raised by
some that the combination of the transsubstantive rules scheme and
the case-management ethos has resulted in too many important
matters being left to the trial court’s discretion.
218
“Discretion lay at the heart of Pound’s jurisprudence.” It also
lies at the heart of case management. Enamored of the benefits of the
equity system, the original drafters of the Civil Rules opted for a set
219
of rules that relied on flexibility and discretion. The members of the
original Advisory Committee knew that an equity-based system
would require a strong judicial hand but nonetheless rejected many
220
proposals that would have reined in the process. Amendments to
Rules 16 and 26 since then have increased judicial control but have
done so flexibly, continuing what Professor David Shapiro has called
221
“the tradition of discretion.”
Discretion is a byproduct of both the transsubstantive nature of
the Civil Rules and the fact that the chief architects of the original
rules were reacting to the costs of inflexibility that manifested in prior
222
procedural schemes. As Professor Subrin has pointed out, our
commitment to having one set of rules for all cases has caused us to
write the Civil Rules with a large degree of generality and to delegate

218. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 521 (2006).
219. See Subrin, supra note 117, at 943–75 (detailing the judicial philosophies of the
drafters). Ironically, if 1938 marked the beginning of the era of procedural discretion, it also
marked the end of the era of substantive discretion with Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), and the end of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See Marcus, supra note
19, at 1576–77 (noting that federal courts could no longer decide for themselves which
substantive rules to apply in diversity cases).
220. Subrin, supra note 117, at 975–82 (noting several proposals rejected by the Advisory
Committee that would have put constraints in place).
221. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1985.
222. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 543–44 (“[T]he chief architects of the original 1938
Federal Rules were steeped in knowledge of the costs of inflexibility associated with common
law and code procedure . . . .”).
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the details of their application to the trial judge’s discretion. In
other words, the Civil Rules often eschew detailed controls in favor of
general policies that guide discretionary application on a case-by-case
224
basis.
Many commentators think the Civil Rules already place too
225
much discretionary power in the hands of federal judges. Professor
Resnik was one of the first to sound the cautionary note that case
management often entails activities that, being less visible and often
226
unreviewable, carry greater risks of abuse of authority. As she puts
it, “Transforming the judge from adjudicator to manager substantially
expands the opportunities for judges to use—or to abuse—their
227
powers.” Professor Donald Elliott echoes this concern that judicial
case management gives judges discretionary power to act without
228
procedural safeguards. Most recently, Professor Jay Tidmarsh has
229
raised his own fears about case management and abuse of power.
Others criticize discretion on more practical grounds. Professor
Bone questions the competence of federal trial judges to exercise
230
discretion. In part, he is echoing Judge Easterbrook’s critique of

223. Subrin, supra note 92, at 44; Subrin, supra note 116, at 391.
224. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1795 (“The effort is less to provide detailed controls and
more to establish general policies that guide discretionary application on a case-specific basis.”).
225. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 3, at 76 (“Unconstrained by precedent, unreviewed by
appellate judges, and unchecked by the involvement of juries, district judges are free to manage
cases as they wish.”). Another author has offered a similar critique of the English procedural
reforms implemented in the wake of the Woolf Report. See Michael Zander, The Woolf
Reforms: What’s the Verdict?, in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra note 11,
at 417, 429 (“The inevitable price of giving the court a wide discretion is that one loses the
advantage of predictability upon which so much in a legal system depends.”).
226. Resnik, supra note 3, at 380; see also Resnik, supra note 136, at 548 (“I am deeply
skeptical of the capacity of individual judges to craft rules on a case-by-case basis.”).
227. Resnik, supra note 27, at 54 (arguing that case-management activities are standardless
and effectively unreviewable); see also Resnik, supra note 87, at 221 (arguing for public judging
activities as a check on state power).
228. Elliott, supra note 1, at 317 (“It seems beyond serious debate, then, that discretionary
managerial decisions may influence the outcome of litigation in ways that are arbitrary because
judges act without the procedural safeguards that accompany decisions on the merits.”).
229. See Tidmarsh, supra note 218, at 559 (“Customizing rules for each case also raises a
concern of great significance in a democratic society: the fear that judges will use their
discretionary power, consciously or subconsciously, to tailor rules in a way that influences the
outcome of individual litigation.”).
230. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007) (“The pervasive assumption that expert trial judges can do a good job
of tailoring procedures to individual cases is empirically unsupported and at best highly
questionable.”); Bone, supra note 140, at 301 (“This degree of trial judge subjectivity and
decisional variance is highly undesirable.”).
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case management, writing: “I am skeptical about the value of broad
discretion because I have grave doubts that trial judges can gather
and process the information necessary to craft case-specific
procedures that produce good outcomes in the highly strategic
231
environment of litigation.” He also worries that individual judges
232
are at risk of succumbing to cognitive biases. According to Bone, a
more detailed scheme of rules would force the rulemakers to grapple
in advance with many of the issues now left to individual judges; as a
group, Bone contends, the rulemakers would be less susceptible to
233
cognitive biases when addressing those issues.
Professor Tidmarsh is even more pessimistic in his assessment of
the practical benefits of discretionary case management. According to
him, reliance on discretion has predictable consequences: expense,
234
delay, unpredictability, and abuse of power. To put it more plainly,
he
contends
that
discretionary
case
management
is
235
counterproductive—that it causes expense. In this respect, Tidmarsh
associates expense and delay with the adversarial litigation culture,
and he thinks that a scheme that leaves matters to discretionary
resolution by the judge simply creates yet another level of
236
gamesmanship.
Critics of discretion see several possible solutions. One
solution—already explored in Section B.2—is to have more than one
set of rules. Professor Burbank, for example, has long argued that
substance-specific rules that provide more detailed guidance—and
constraints—are preferable to transsubstantive rules that rely on
237
judicial discretion.
Another proposed solution is to demand that the Civil Rules,
even if applicable to all cases, provide more detail and guidance.

231. Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1155, 1170 (2006).
232. Bone, supra note 230, at 1989 (“These predictions too are prone to cognitive bias.”).
233. Id.
234. Tidmarsh, supra note 218, at 558.
235. Id. at 559 (“The savings or reductions in delay that case management achieves in one
case were often offset by increased expenses or greater delays of additional customized
procedures in another.”).
236. Id. at 535 (“[D]iscretionary procedure creates a new level of gamesmanship—arguing
not only over questions of compliance with procedural rules but also over the very rules to
apply.”).
237. See Burbank, supra note 138, at 1936–37 (criticizing a system where “substance-specific
procedures and empirical investigation of supposedly neutral rules are anathema” and citing
evidence that “furnishes reasons to be concerned about discretionary justice”).
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Professor Bone, for example, thinks that the rulemakers use
discretion to duck hard choices. He thinks the rulemakers have been
reluctant to squarely and openly resolve difficult questions, and as a
result have “kicked the can down the road” by placing the resolution
238
of those questions within trial courts’ discretion. The result,
according to Bone, is that those difficult questions get answered not
through the public rulemaking process but through individual case
adjudication, a forum that is less visible, less transparent, and not
239
subject to public debate. Bone speculates, perhaps too cynically,
that one reason for this is that judges dominate the rulemaking
240
process and discretion maximizes their individual power.
But there may be very good reasons for committing matters to
trial judges’ discretion. Reflecting on the use of discretion, Professor
Cooper observed,
Discretion is a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult—as it
almost always is—to foresee even the most important problems and
to determine their wise resolution. Reliance on discretion is
vindicated only when district judges and magistrate judges use it
wisely most of the time and in most cases. The ongoing revisions of
the Civil Rules time and again reflect an implicit judgment that
confidence is well placed in the discretionary exercise of power by
241
federal trial judges.

238. See Bone, supra note 230, at 1974 (“[D]elegating discretion allows rulemakers to dodge
difficult and controversial normative choices by handing them to trial judges in individual cases,
where they are less transparent and less likely to trigger public debate.”).
239. Id. (“It is much easier for rulemakers to compromise on a general rule that leaves the
controversial issues to the discretion of the trial judge than to resolve the disagreement at the
level of drafting the general rule itself.”).
240. See id. (“[J]udges have come to dominate membership on the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad discretion. Discretion gives them
more control over their own courtrooms and cases, and makes judging more interesting and
potentially more rewarding.” (footnotes omitted)). Other scholars have further addressed this
hypothesis. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994) (“[T]he rules of procedure are formulated by
judges. If the self-interest of those judges conflicts with the efficiency criterion, it would seem
plausible that the judges will formulate procedural rules that further their own interests rather
than the interests of efficiency.”), with Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and
Procedural Rules, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 647 (1994) (disputing the hypothesis).
241. Cooper, supra note 178, at 1795. I am indebted to Judge Rosenthal for tipping me off to
this quote about whether federal judges are worthy of the discretion they have: “Procedures for
effective judicial administration presuppose a federal judiciary composed of judges wellequipped and of sturdy character in whom may safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of
judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal.” Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (discussing discretion in the context of abstention).
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Professor Marcus, a longtime consultant to the Advisory Committee
and now the Co-Reporter, also defends the use of discretion in the
Civil Rules. While he agrees that there is a theoretical possibility that
trial judges will use their discretion to promote individual substantive
agendas, he notes that there is little real evidence that trial judges
242
have been doing so. Indeed, he supposes, the fact that discretionary
case management continues to enjoy strong support from lawyers
from all parts of the bar suggests that the theoretical possibility of
243
agenda pushing is not being felt on the ground. Professor Marcus is
also skeptical about the alternatives to discretion in case
management, saying that proposed remedies, such as added appellate
review or making the pretrial rules more rigid, are no better, and are
244
likely worse.
It is not just current rulemaking “insiders” who find value in
discretion. In his article assessing Rule 16, Professor Shapiro wrote,
[T]he rulemakers were right in believing that significant discretion
should be delegated—that the frequent use of ‘may’ was a wise
decision. This is so not only because the Rule was an innovative one,
but because cases vary in ways that are difficult to spell out in
advance, because judges vary in their ability and willingness to make
effective use of such techniques, and because ‘local legal cultures’
245
vary in their receptiveness to certain techniques and practices.

Ultimately, one cannot say in any categorical sense that
discretion in the rules is “good” or “bad.” Judgments like that depend
on issues of degree and context. In his seminal analysis of procedural
discretion, Professor Rosenberg explained that there are good
reasons and bad reasons for conferring procedural discretion on trial
246
judges. In the context of rule formulation, building discretion into a
rule is proper if the subject cannot be helpfully reduced to more

242. Marcus, supra note 1, at 1607.
243. Id. at 1611 (“[L]awyers’ enthusiasm for giving [judges] more [discretion] suggests that
we have not reached a point where that discretion is abused with great frequency.”).
244. Id. at 1611–12 (pointing to experiences with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as
cautioning against efforts to use rigid schedules to combat the allegedly inconsistent application
of discretionary rules).
245. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1995.
246. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 660–65 (1971). In this article, Professor Rosenberg distinguishes
between primary discretion, which involves the power to create the governing standard, and
secondary, or “limited review,” discretion, in which the trial court follows existing standards
with limited appellate review of the trial judge’s choices. Id. at 637.
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particularized guidance because it would be impracticable—if not
impossible—to anticipate and address all of the situations that might
247
arise under the rule. In contrast, neither the drive for efficiency or
finality, nor a desire to boost trial-judge morale, would properly
248
warrant giving trial judges discretionary power.
Professor
Rosenberg stresses that rulemakers must be careful only to confer
249
discretion for the right reasons. And even when discretion is
appropriate, the rulemakers should, to the extent possible, state the
degree of discretion given, set some boundaries, or at least articulate
250
some guiding principles.
I take Professor Bone to be making essentially the same points
when he says that “[r]ulemakers should treat case-specific discretion
as an explicit policy choice rather than an implicit default, evaluate its
costs and benefits in each procedural context, and make a considered
judgment about how much discretion to grant and what controls or
251
guidelines to include.” I wholeheartedly agree with those views.
252
Moreover, my personal view, contrary to Bone’s assessment, is that
the Advisory Committee has, at least in modern times, followed that
prescription quite faithfully. Nonetheless, the point remains an
important one, and the rulemakers must be sure to keep it in mind as
they consider new proposals that would rely even more on
discretionary judgment to resolve cases fairly and efficiently.
But it is not my aim here to propose a definitive answer to
whether the Civil Rules already have too much discretion built into
them, or to whether the discretion that does exist in case management
alleviates or exacerbates the cost and delay issues to which they are
253
addressed. For present purposes, the important point is simply to

247. Id. at 662–63. A second “good” reason for discretion recognized by Professor
Rosenberg was that the trial judge, by virtue of “being there” at the time and having the benefit
of seeing a fuller picture of the events, would be in better position than a reviewing court to
decide the issue. Id. at 663. This reason for discretion, however, speaks more to appellate review
standards than to the level of detail with which the trial court rules should be written.
248. Id. at 660–62.
249. Id. at 667.
250. Id. at 659.
251. Bone, supra note 230, at 2002.
252. See id. at 1964–65 (“I propose that the Advisory Committee justify in explicit terms
how much discretion to delegate and in what form. In that regard, the Committee should review
the various methods for limiting or channeling discretion.”).
253. In this Article, I am not addressing whether it is appropriate to give trial judges
discretion to determine whether a claim has been adequately pleaded, even though that can be
said to be a form of case management. There certainly may be areas where judicial discretion (as
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emphasize that any reform efforts that would lean even more heavily
on case management must account for the concerns of some that
federal judges already exercise a dangerous amount of discretion.
Many—including, it seems, the majority of the practicing bar—see
increased case management as a key part of solving the problems of
excess cost and delay. That might mean giving federal judges more
discretionary case-management powers. It certainly means getting
federal judges to more actively use the discretionary casemanagement powers they already have. Given the highly
discretionary nature of case management under the Civil Rules,
either would result in more discretionary decisionmaking. For the
critics of the current model, that would mean more of a bad thing.
D. Can Case Management Solve the “Cost Problem” by
Itself (If at All)?
The previous Sections addressed objections to the casemanagement model, ranging from the concern that managerial
judging is eroding the nature of judging to the criticism that our
reliance on case management is a symptom of a critical flaw in our
one-size-fits-all rules scheme—that by trying to do too much it fails to
meaningfully answer policy questions and therefore must submerge
those questions by punting them to ad hoc decisionmaking by
individual judges. In this Section, I assume that the case-management
model is sound procedural policy and ask whether other aspects of the
federal pretrial scheme must change for it to succeed. I begin with a
quick review of the competing views regarding the effectiveness of
case management generally. I then consider two types of reforms to
the federal pretrial scheme that might improve the effectiveness of
case management. The first type is structural reform. Are there ways
to change or add to the existing pretrial scheme to facilitate effective
case management? The second type of reform is cultural. Is the
answer to the problem of excess cost and delay to have more or

opposed to judgment) is not warranted, and one of those areas is at the stage of determining the
sufficiency of the pleadings. As Professor Miller points out in his paper for the Duke
Conference, there is no small irony that the Supreme Court seems to have entrusted the same
trial judges who reportedly cannot use their judgment and discretion to manage cases with
making pleadings decisions based on their judgment and experience. See Miller, supra note 4, at
59–60 (“It is curious that, in the same opinions, the Court entrusted district judges with the
freedom to use judicial experience and common sense to dismiss a claim at genesis for
noncompliance with a plausibility-pleading requirement, but . . . denied them the freedom to
manage the early phases of their cases . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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different rules, or is it to change the overly adversarial culture of
litigation, particularly in discovery?
1. Case Management as a Cure for Undue Cost and Delay.
Depending on who one asks, case management is either an effective
tonic for undue cost and delay or a snake-oil solution that is doomed
to leave the patient sick. Over twenty years ago, Judge Easterbrook
pronounced that case management cannot work because judges lack
the information needed to distinguish between “good” discovery and
254
“bad” discovery. Professor Bone and Professor Martin Redish share
255
Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism. Professor Paul Stancil offers a
different kind of law-and-economics critique, arguing that casemanagement solutions are doomed to fail because judges have
incentives to minimize their workloads by leaving discovery to the
256
257
parties. Based on the oral argument in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it would
seem that some of the Justices are skeptical of case management as a
cost-control scheme because it places too much reliance on the wise
258
exercise of discretion by hundreds of different trial-level judges.

254. Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 638–39.
255. Bone, supra note 142, at 899–900 (“The Twombly Court’s skepticism is in fact well
justified. Serious litigation problems should not be left to trial judge discretion as much as they
are today. Judges face information and other constraints that impair their ability to manage
optimally, especially in the highly strategic environment of litigation.”); Martin H. Redish,
Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 603–04 (2001) (arguing that
proportionality limits are impractical because the trial court is not in a good position to assess
whether the desired information is worth the cost).
256. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 96–97 (2009).
McMillan and Siegel offer a similar, though less cynical, view:
These problems cannot be solved merely by asking our judicial system to “try
harder.” Recent amendments to the Civil Rules have tended to fall short because
they merely permit rather than require better case management by judges. Judges
have been too easily diverted from exercising their new discretionary authority. As a
result, quicker and cheaper justice continues to be dispensed erratically, if at all, in
many jurisdictions. This is an institutional problem, which no amount of wellintentioned exhortation is likely to correct.
McMillan & Siegel, supra note 215, at 437–38.
257. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
258. See Oral Argument at 34:34, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2008 WL 5168391 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2008)
(No. 07-1015) (Scalia, J.), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07_1015/
argument (“Well, I mean, that’s lovely: That the ability of the Attorney General and the
Director of the FBI to—to do their jobs without having to litigate personal liability is dependent
upon the discretionary decision of a single district judge. I mean, I thought that the protection of
qualified immunity gave them—gave them more than that.”). In response to the idea that highlevel federal officials could be protected from excessive discovery by trial court orders staying
discovery as to them while other aspects of the case proceeded, Justice Alito remarked, “How
many district judges are there in the country? Over 600. One of the district judges has a very
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But not everyone views case management as a failure. Though
Professor Elliott viewed the need for case management as proof that
the Civil Rules suffered from a design flaw, he nonetheless was
persuaded that case management could in fact reduce delay and
259
expense. The Judicial Conference’s Civil Litigation Management
Manual makes a special point of stating that, although it is true that
the lawyers will know more about the case than the judge, that fact
“should not deter [judges] . . . from management, based on [their]
260
experience and after consultation with counsel.” And Professor
Miller, though interested in pursuing supplemental reforms and not
wholly satisfied with the current state of affairs, remains committed to
the case-management model:
Abandoning what has been developed over the years is not a
rational option, and nothing in the Federal Judicial Center’s
empirical work referred to earlier suggests it should be. A district or
magistrate judge, through his or her control over scheduling and the
discovery process, represents the best—if not the only—hope in the
procedural arsenal for containing excessive litigation behavior and
the type of attrition activity that breeds cost and delay, especially in
261
large-scale cases.
262

In his critique of Rule 16, which he faults for being too detailed,
Professor Michael Tigar nonetheless stresses the importance of case
management to (1) prompt settlement before parties incur discovery
costs, (2) get control of discovery early to focus and limit discovery
and to send the message to parties to “quit messing around,” and (3)
structure an iterative process that looks to resolve critical issues first
when possible and holds off on discovery of the rest until those are
263
resolved.

aggressive idea about what the discovery should be. What’s the protection there?” Id. at 49:05
(Alito, J.).
259. Elliott, supra note 1, at 315–16.
260. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 28.
261. Miller, supra note 4, at 115.
262. Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management under the Amended Rules: Too Many
Words for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137, 138 (1994) (“[T]here has been, particularly in the
past decade, such tinkering and fiddling with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the
rulemakers themselves are defeating the objective of a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.’ The 1993 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 . . . is a symptom of this meddling.” (footnote omitted)).
263. Id. at 152–54.
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Debate about the ability of case management to reduce cost and
264
delay is nothing new, nor is it unique to the United States. But it
remains critically important. One of the focuses of the latest wave of
empirical studies is to determine whether case management has
fulfilled its promise. If case management does not help at all, or, as
Professor Tidmarsh recently suggested, it turns out to be
265
counterproductive, then we need to quickly start taking steps to
turn around the battleship. But even if we assume that case
management works, that does not end the reform debate. One can be
a supporter of case management and still advocate other reforms. It is
one thing to say that case management helps; it is a quite different
thing to say that case management is enough by itself. Thus, even
some of the staunchest supporters of the case-management model
believe that complementary reforms are needed.
2. Structural Reforms to Facilitate Case Management. In this
Section, I explore various proposals for enhancing case management
by altering the existing pretrial structure. One approach might be to
pair aggressive case management with aggressive structural reforms
to the existing pleading and discovery system. Proponents of the more
aggressive structural reforms can draw strength from signs that the
Supreme Court has lost faith in the ability of case management, by
itself, to control cost and delay. In its now legendary decision in Bell
266
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court questioned, for the
first time, whether the case-management reforms of the past three

264. Professor Zander, the most vocal critic of the 1998 English Civil Practice Rules adopted
in the wake of the Woolf Report, has opposed those reforms on the basis that their increased
reliance on case management will increase cost and delay, rather than reduce it. See Zander,
supra note 225, at 420–21, 424–28 (relying in part on the 1996 RAND Study). In general,
though, English reformers seem to take the other side of the debate and continue to support
case management. Lord Jackson gave a particularly strong endorsement of the benefits of case
management in his 2009 review of civil litigation costs, saying,
All the feedback which I have received during the Costs Review indicates that
(despite academic skepticism) both costs and time are saved by good case
management. By good case management, I mean that a judge of relevant expertise
takes a grip on the case, identifies the issues and gives directions which are focused
upon the early resolution of those issues. I accept that this evidence is anecdotal,
although it is supported by my own experience both as a barrister and as a judge.
LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, supra note 11, at 394.
265. Tidmarsh, supra note 218, at 559.
266. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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decades would effectively deal with cost and delay issues. As partial
justification for holding that pleadings must include plausible grounds
for inferring the required elements of the claims in question, Justice
Souter parroted Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement
to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery
process through “careful case management” given the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
268
abuse has been on the modest side.
269

Twombly represents access-based reform. It operates from the
premise that if the pretrial scheme cannot control the cost of cases
once they get to discovery, then the only way to control cost is to stop
cases from getting to discovery in the first place. But while Twombly
certainly appears to opt for access-based cost control over case
management, I do not read the case as asserting categorically that
case management does not work. Rather, I take the Supreme Court’s
meaning to be that case management does not adequately protect
defendants from groundless claims. But what about claims that the
Court thinks should survive the pleadings stage? I find nothing in
Twombly to suggest that the Court has lost faith in the ability of
judicial case management to find the right balance of pretrial
activities and costs in those cases. Indeed, in that context, the Court
may well subscribe to the view, voiced in dissent by Justice Stevens in
Twombly, that federal judges have a vast “case-management arsenal”
to combat “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming”
270
discovery. After all, it was not that long ago—1987 to be precise—
when the Supreme Court seemed to express greater faith in the
ability of case management to control cost, remarking that “[j]udicial
267. Id. at 559; see also Bone, supra note 142, at 898–99 (stating that Twombly was the first
case in which the Supreme Court had questioned the effectiveness of the case-management
approach to dealing with cost and delay issues); supra note 258.
268. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 638 (citation omitted)).
The Twombly Court’s reliance on Judge Easterbrook’s article has been criticized. See Burbank,
supra note 121, at 559 n.108. So too has Judge Easterbrook’s article. See Carrington, supra note
145, at 628.
269. See Bone, supra note 142, at 876 (“[This article] views Twombly not so much as a
pleading decision but rather as a court access decision, one that addresses a general problem of
institutional design: how best to prevent undesirable lawsuits from entering the court system.”);
see also Burbank, supra note 121, at 561 (discussing Twombly’s effect on court access); A.
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 368
(2010) (locating Twombly as part of a larger movement to restrict access to justice).
270. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and
271
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests.”
The IAALS is one of the groups urging structural reform to
272
control the cost of discovery. It advocates fact-based pleading. The
stated purpose of this proposed reform is cost control. As explained
in the Final Report issued jointly by the IAALS and the ACTL, “One
of the primary criticisms of notice pleading is that it leads to more
discovery than is necessary to identify and prepare for a valid legal
273
dispute.” In principle, the notion that more detailed pleading can
help focus discovery seems self-evident and is worth serious
consideration. It seeks to build upon case management by providing
274
judges with better information to do the job.
The IAALS and the ACTL have taken pains lately to distance
275
276
themselves from the plausibility test of Twombly and Iqbal and
also to emphasize that the point of their proposal urging fact-based
pleading is not to limit court access but to control discovery. This is an
important distinction. At a theoretical level, it ultimately suggests the
concept of decoupling the pleading requirements of Rule 8 from the
dismissal standard of Rule 12. In other words, it raises the possibility
that one might require fact-based pleading for case-management
purposes but still test the sufficiency of pleadings against some lesser
277
metric. That notion is, in many ways, akin to revitalizing practice
271. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546
(1987).
272. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., supra note 80, at 5; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS, supra note
104, at 3 (“The party that bears the burden of proof . . . must plead with particularity all material
facts that are known to that party that support that claim or affirmative defense and each
remedy sought . . . .”).
273. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., supra note 80, at 5.
274. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE 4–7 (2010)
(“[E]arly disclosure of known material facts should not be difficult . . . and should result in early
narrowing of the issues . . . . [O]ur Principles are meant to encourage use of our civil justice
system by those who . . . are foreclosed due to excessive delay and expense.”); see also Rebecca
Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 245, 279 (2010) (“The introduction of facts at the pleading stage will help the judge
identify the specific issues in dispute, which in turn will increase the judge’s ability to make
comprehensive and informed decisions about the scope of discovery and pretrial practice.”).
275. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–61.
276. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944, 1949 (2009).
277. Although the IAALS disclaims any intent to restrict court access based on the
pleadings, their main pleading-reform proposal may in fact result in additional dismissals at the
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under Rule 12(e), which allows a party who must respond to a
pleading to ask that the pleader be required to provide a “more
278
definite statement,” but with a critical twist. In this context, the
reason for requiring additional detail is not to enable the other party
to answer or to file a motion testing the pleadings but to generate
279
inputs for effective case management.
A different type of structural reform designed to complement
case management would be to create case-management protocols for
different types of cases. The idea is that committees composed of
judges, academics, lawyers from all sides of the bar, and other
interested persons could, for any particular type of case, develop a
protocol setting forth nonbinding standards regarding discovery,
280
motion practice, scheduling, or other topics. Building on this theme,
it has also been suggested that pattern discovery requests might be
developed for use either on their own or in conjunction with these

pleading stage. Specifically, it is not fully clear to me what a court would do under the IAALS
proposal if it found that a party had failed to plead its facts with particularity. Proposed Pilot
Project Rule 2.1 and the accompanying Comment states that a party may plead facts on
information and belief. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS, supra note
104, at 3 (“As to facts that are pleaded on information and belief, the pleading party must set
forth in detail the basis for the information and belief.”). The Comment adds, however, that
“information and belief” pleading should not be used to evade “the intent of the rule”; rather,
parties who lack information should resort to Pilot Project Rule 3 to undertake precomplaint
discovery. Id. But Pilot Project Rule 3.1(b) conditions precomplaint discovery on the judge
determining that “the moving party has probable cause to believe that the information sought
by the discovery will enable preparation of a legally sufficient complaint.” Id. at 4. Taking all of
this together, it is not clear to me what result would obtain if a plaintiff could not plead a
particular fact and could not persuade the judge that good cause existed for precomplaint
discovery as to that fact. If the answer is that the complaint would be dismissed, then the
requirement of fact-based pleading would seem to have force beyond providing additional
inputs for discovery control and case management.
278. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response.”).
279. In 2006, before Twombly and Iqbal, the Advisory Committee discussed the idea of
amending Rule 12(e) as a means of generating additional information for case-management
purposes. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MEETING
OF SEPTEMBER 7–8, 2006, DRAFT MINUTES 22–24, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV09-2006-min.pdf. Those discussions did not lead to
any concrete rule proposal then, though it is possible that the subject might resurface should the
Advisory Committee undertake efforts to revisit pleading standards in the wake of Twombly
and Iqbal.
280. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 404–05 (noting that it would be helpful to judges and
lawyers to provide norms through suggested standards or protocols for certain types of
repetitive, time-consuming, and expensive litigation).
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281

protocols. The pattern requests would streamline discovery because
parties would know that the requests were not objectionable. On the
other hand, parties that served discovery beyond the pattern requests
would, in the event of a particularized objection, bear the burden of
showing that the discovery was relevant and proportional. These
types of standardized protocols would not be binding on their own,
though a judge could make them binding by incorporating them into
a case-management order. Their principal value, rather, would be in
setting benchmarks that would guide less-experienced practitioners
and help inform judges about how best to employ their custom282
tailoring tools, like the proportionality limits under Rule 26(b)(2).
Case-management protocols (or pattern discovery protocols)
might also deliver a valuable secondary benefit—they might help
lawyers deal with the sometimes unrealistic or even
counterproductive expectations of their clients. At the January 2009
meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, the Committee invited various individuals to participate in
283
a Panel Discussion on Problems in Civil Litigation. At that
discussion, several lawyers were asked why protocols were needed
given that lawyers could already achieve the same outcome by
cooperation and agreement. One answer was that a restrained and
sensible approach would be easier to justify to their clients if it came
from a court-sponsored and generally applicable protocol. In other
words, the protocols would provide “cover” to the lawyers who
284
followed them.
The idea of subject-specific, lawyer-developed protocols is worth
a close look. It was raised at the January 2009 meeting of the Standing

281. See Joseph Garrison, A Proposal to Implement a Cost-Effective and Efficient
Procedural Tool into Federal Litigation Practice (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (suggesting that courts adopt pattern interrogatories, pattern requests to
produce documents, and a pattern protective order in cases that routinely appear in federal
courts).
282. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 405 (stating that substance-specific protocols “would aid
lawyers in advising their clients, and aid judges, by providing suggested standards to help inform
their procedural decisions” (footnote omitted)).
283. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., MEETING OF JANUARY 12–13, 2009, DRAFT MINUTES 32, available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST01-2009.pdf.
284. Cf. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 14
(“Court-imposed limits provide lawyers with the ‘cover’ they need to practice limited
discovery.”).
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Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Professor Subrin
once again raises the issue in his most recent critique of the
transsubstantive rules, suggesting protocols (in conjunction with a
simple-case track) as a way of providing more detailed norms and
286
guidance than the current rules provide. The IAALS Civil Caseflow
Management Guidelines also suggest that judges develop subjectbased case-management protocols by “categorizing cases by type in a
way that would presume a certain level of judicial involvement for
287
certain types of cases.” Even the British are taking a hard look at
adding case-management protocols to their pretrial scheme. In his
recent report on litigation costs, Lord Justice Jackson recommended
the following:
In my view, a menu of standard paragraphs for case management
directions should be prepared for each type of case of common
occurrence and made available to all district judges both in hard
copy and online. These standard directions should then be used by
district judges as their starting point in formulating initial case
288
management directions.

3. Culture Change. Structural reforms—like changes to the
system of notice pleading and liberal discovery, or the addition of
subject-specific protocols—are not the only types of reforms that
could be paired with the case-management model to leverage its
effectiveness. A very different approach might be to leave the casemanagement scheme in place but to change how judges and lawyers
use it. Professor Thomas Rowe, himself a former member of the
Advisory Committee, has observed that the case-management model
will inevitably struggle to control costs if lawyers continue to act like
spoiled children, requiring judges to provide the equivalent of
289
constant adult supervision. Perhaps this suggests that what we need
is not new rules but better play.

285. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 283, at 36–37.
286. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 404–05 (“[S]ubstance-specific protocols may be in order
for some types of litigation that have been excluded from the simple track. Such protocols
would be suggestive and not binding, until a judge chose to mandate them or portions of them.”
(footnote omitted)).
287. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 7.
288. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, supra note 11, at 393 (emphasis added).
289. See Rowe, supra note 30, at 213 (noting that litigators occasionally require judicial
“‘adult supervision’” to foster pretrial cooperation).
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In July 2008, the Sedona Conference released The Sedona
Conference
Cooperation
Proclamation
(The
Cooperation
Proclamation), launching a campaign to promote cooperative,
290
nonadversarial discovery. Last fall, the Sedona Conference followed
291
up with The Case for Cooperation. That document represents the
second stage of the Sedona Conference’s campaign to promote
cooperation. It explores the relationship of cooperation to the
discovery rules and the ethics rules, showing that those rules either
292
assume or require certain forms of cooperation. Perhaps more
critically, The Case for Cooperation explores the benefits of
293
cooperation for lawyers and clients. Too often, lawyers simply
default to battle mode in discovery, without even considering what
they are fighting over, why they are fighting, or whether it is in their
294
clients’ best interests to fight over that particular item.
A sure first step in using culture change to control costs in
discovery would be simply to get lawyers to abide by their existing
rules-based and ethical duties. One of the best ways for lawyers to
control discovery costs is to start talking to each other early. The
discovery-planning conference required under Rule 26(f) provides an
295
ideal, built-in opportunity for the lawyers to do that. The Advisory
Committee note to the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) emphasizes the
importance of early planning to address a wide range of e-discovery
issues, from preservation to form of production to methods of
privilege review, in an attempt to control the cost and burden of e296
discovery. Yet lawyers still admit that they often do not have
297
meaningful Rule 26(f) conferences. Lawyers clamor for judges to
290. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 331 (Supp. 2009) (“The Sedona Conference launches a coordinated
effort to promote cooperation by all parties to the discovery process to achieve the goal of a
‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”).
291. The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339 (Supp.
2009).
292. Id. at 345–54; see also Gensler, Bull’s-Eye View, supra note 34, at 365–69 (discussing
ways in which the Civil Rules impose duties that can be characterized as duties of cooperation).
293. The Sedona Conference, supra note 291, at 356–62.
294. See Gensler, E-volving Duties, supra note 34, at 555–56 (asserting that lawyers should
“‘stop and think’” about whether cooperation would serve their clients’ best interests).
295. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
296. Id. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
297. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 15 (noting that more than half of all survey
respondents admitted that they did not discuss e-discovery at their discovery planning
conference); see also Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 9 (“Anecdotal evidence from the
judges’ perspective indicates that courts seldom receive proposed discovery plans from the
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298

take a more active role in case management, but if the lawyers do
not make the effort to know their own case needs, how can they
expect the judges to enter thoughtful, case-specific case-management
orders? More to the point, if lawyers want judges to hold the types of
Rule 16 conferences described by Judge Rosenthal, then they need to
have laid the groundwork to have that type of detailed
299
conversation. Perfunctory Rule 26(f) conferences and bare-bones
Rule 26(f) reports deprive judges of the very information they need in
order to perform the active case-management functions that lawyers
seem to crave.
Fidelity to the text and spirit of Rule 26(g) would also help
control discovery cost and delay. Added as part of the discoverycontainment package of amendments in 1983, Rule 26(g) requires
lawyers to provide Rule 11–like certifications for their discovery
300
requests and responses. Among other things, lawyers must certify
that their requests are proportional to the needs of the case and that
their responses—including objections—are warranted and not
301
interposed for an improper purpose. As Judge Grimm recently
302
wrote in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., lawyers regularly
violate Rule 26(g) by serving excessive and thoughtlessly broad
303
discovery requests and by responding with blanket objections. In
effect, lawyers look to judicial case management (including through
discovery motions) to perform the type of case customization that
Rule 26(g) requires them to perform. To be sure, judges will always
be needed to resolve legitimate discovery disputes. But there would
be far fewer discovery disputes, and the issues they raised would be
much more focused, if lawyers abided by their duties under Rule
26(g) and stopped taking a blunderbuss approach to discovery.
If culture change is to complement judicial case management,
however, it cannot stop with fidelity to the rules. The greatest gains
may depend on getting lawyers and clients to appreciate that

parties that reflect meaningful efforts to drill down on the issues they are supposed to discuss at
the Rule 26(f) conference.”).
298. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
299. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 241 (suggesting that district judges require lawyers to
be present for Rule 16 conferences and engage in a genuine exchange about the case).
300. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
301. Id.
302. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008).
303. Id. at 362. For more from Judge Grimm on what lawyers must do (and stop doing) to
comply with Rule 26(g), see Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 11–14.
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cooperation can, at times, be the better litigation strategy. Real
culture change will arrive when clients expect their lawyers to make
thoughtful decisions about when to cooperate and when to fight in
discovery. Real culture change will take hold when lawyers, backed by
their clients, view their rules-based obligations, their ethical
obligations, and their strategic choices as part of an integrated process
that works most effectively when the lawyers talk to each other,
cooperate to reach agreement when possible, and pick their fights
305
more thoughtfully and selectively. Lawyers say that they would
306
prefer “rifle shot” discovery to discovery by “carpet-bombing.”
Defaulting to battle mode will not get us there. But if those lawyers
“learned to work together—by communicating and by developing
agreed plans that took an iterative approach—then they would be in a
307
much better position to trade in their cannon for rifles.”
The Cooperation Proclamation views cooperation as a necessary
308
adjunct to the case-management model. Our system leaves the
development of the facts in the hands of the parties. Despite claims
by some that it is preferable to put fact development in the hands of
309
the judge, there does not appear to be any serious push to move to a
civil law inquisitorial system. Lawyers still seem to want to be the
ones driving discovery. But the reality is that, given the current
structure of the rules, even the best judicial case managers cannot
fulfill that role if the parties insist on fighting over everything they
could possibly fight about. One need look no further than the 2006 e-

304. See Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 18 (“The challenge is to convince clients that
it is in their economic interest to cooperate with the adverse party to reduce costs so as to focus
on what really matters.”).
305. See Gensler, Bull’s-Eye View, supra note 34, at 370–72 (describing a method of
discovery in which parties work together and pursue a discovery process based on reason and
efficiency).
306. Id. at 372.
307. Id.
308. The IAALS also endorses cooperation as a means of discovery-cost control. See INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 14 (“Cooperation between
counsel can greatly reduce the cost and time associated with discovery.”).
309. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 824 (1985) (asserting that the West German civil procedure system’s requirement that
judges rather than lawyers investigate facts is better than the United States’ civil procedure
system).
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discovery amendments to find an expression of the sense that judges
310
alone cannot manage all of the problems posed by e-discovery.
In the end, how one feels about the prospects of the casemanagement model to address cost and delay issues may depend in
large part on whether one thinks that the litigants and their lawyers—
or as Professor Rowe once called them, “the adversarial scorpions in
[the] litigation bottle”—can find ways to cooperate with each other
311
and the judge. Perhaps it is true that the rules are just fine—that all
we need is better play. In that event, case management can proceed
without significant structural reforms. Recent survey results suggest
that lawyers are beginning to realize that they can cooperate and still
be zealous advocates, and that they are already capturing some of the
312
benefits of cooperation. Cooperation skeptics, however, would
argue that the cooperative ideal is unrealistic because lawyers and
clients will continue to view it as advantageous to demand everything
313
and produce little. If that is true, then we are effectively left, at best,
with Professor Rowe’s spoiled children in need of constant “‘adult
supervision,’” and at worst with his “adversarial scorpions in [the]
314
litigation bottle.” In that event, the case-management model may
well need to be paired with something else—perhaps significant
structural reforms—if it is to succeed.
E. Should Judges “Manage Up” or “Manage Down”?
In this last Section, I return to the question of how “big” or
“small” the Civil Rules should be. Section B.2 considered proposals
to have multiple sets of rules based on the size of the case, either by a
tracking system with multiple tracks or by creating a set of simplified
rules for simple cases. In this Section, I assume that the system will
continue to be transsubstantive and uniform—that is, that there will

310. See Gensler, E-volving Duties, supra note 34, at 535 (“The 2006 version of Rule 26(f)
still contemplates a strong role for judicial case management, but . . . it is directed as much, if
not more, at the party level.”).
311. Rowe, supra note 30, at 213 (“[Pretrial managerial judging] requires that the
adversarial scorpions in their litigation bottle seek ways to cooperate, at least as to pretrial
procedural management, with each other and the judge.”).
312. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 78, at 139 (noting that 95 percent of attorneys
surveyed agreed that a case costs less when all counsel are collaborative and professional); LEE
& WILLGING, supra note 77, at 31, 63.
313. See Stancil, supra note 256, at 99 (“The adversary system . . . understandably magnifies
the impact of systemic distrust between the parties.”).
314. Rowe, supra note 30, at 213.
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continue to be one set of rules for all cases. The task that remains is to
determine what the default dimensions of that single set of rules
should be.
Roughly speaking, there are three possible targets for the size of
the rules. We can write rules that target the larger cases, we can write
rules that target the middle cases, or we can write rules that target the
smaller cases. The choice determines the direction in which trial
judges depart by case management. If the rules are written for “big
cases,” judges must “manage down” in cases that are not big. If the
rules are written for “small cases,” judges must “manage up” in all of
the cases that are not small. If the rules are written for the middle
range of cases, then judges may need to manage either up or down
depending on the circumstances.
Within the rulemaking community, there is probably a general
315
sense that the Civil Rules are targeted for the middle range of cases.
In 2000, the scope of discovery was redefined according to relevance
to the parties’ claims and defenses, subject to expanding discovery to
subject-matter relevance upon a showing of good cause and to
316
limiting discovery based on proportionality. Some might view that
as seeking to chart a middle course. In 1993, presumptive limits were
placed on the number of depositions that could be taken and the
317
number of interrogatories that could be served. Here too, the court
318
can adjust upward or downward. That also might be seen as seeking
319
to chart a middle course.

315. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1800 (“It has been common to wonder whether the
inevitable compromises have produced rules that work well for most litigation in the middle
range, but do not work as well for cases at the extremes.”).
316. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
317. Id. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; id. 33(a)(1) &
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
318. See id. 26(b)(2) (“[T]he court may alter the limits in these rules on the number of
depositions and interrogatories . . . .”); id. 30(a)(2) (requiring a party to obtain leave of the
court, and the court to grant leave to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2), if a deposition
would result in more than ten depositions being taken under Rule 31); id. 33(a)(1) (“Leave to
serve additional interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2).”).
319. The suggestion has often been made that there should be a similar presumptive limit on
the number of document requests that may be served under Rule 34. A variation on that theme,
inspired by the growing importance of e-discovery, is that there should be a presumptive limit
on the number of sources that a party can be required to search. These proposals warrant
serious consideration. It may be that, in the absence of presumptive limits, the 1970 amendment
that allowed parties to serve document requests directly without seeking leave of the court and
showing good cause upended the balance. See id. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970
amendment.
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But not everyone would agree that the Civil Rules have in fact
hit the center. Professor Subrin, for example, has hypothesized that
perhaps 5 to 15 percent of civil cases are complex enough to warrant
320
active judicial case management. He suggests that the standard rules
are simply too big and costly for most cases. His proposed remedy is
to have simplified standard rules with detailed pleading, mandatory
disclosures, reduced discovery, little or no case management, and firm
321
trial dates. In those cases in which active case management is
322
needed, the court could move the case into a “complex rules” mode.
323
The IAALS Pilot Project Rules share the view that the existing
Civil Rules create a default structure that is too big and costly. Like
Professor Subrin’s proposal, the Pilot Project Rules provide for
324
detailed pleading, mandatory disclosures, and limited discovery.
Unlike Professor Subrin’s proposal, the Pilot Project Rules still call
325
for active case management. What is most important, though, is that
the animating principle of the Pilot Project Rules is to re-set the
“standard” track of procedure to a set of simplified rules. Indeed, the
Comment to Pilot Project Rule 1 criticizes the Civil Rules as
establishing the “notion that parties are entitled to discover all facts,
without limit, unless and until a court says otherwise” and adds that,
therefore, “[i]t is the purpose of these [Rules] that the default be
326
changed.”
Implicit (if not explicit) in the Subrin and IAALS proposals is
the idea that, whether intended as such or not, the Civil Rules are in
fact designed for the most complex cases. Thus, Subrin and the
IAALS would say that not only are the Civil Rules one size, they are
Cadillac size. And by providing only Cadillac-size rules for all cases,
Subrin and the IAALS would say that the Civil Rules drive up cost
and delay by turning small cases into big ones. This occurs because
the presumption is that all cases will be litigated as big cases until the
320. See Subrin, supra note 213, at 177.
321. Id. at 176; see also Subrin, supra note 116, at 398–405 (proposing a “simple track” for
cases that generally do not involve the full array of federal procedure); Subrin, supra note 92, at
45–46 (“[W]e should provide a more constricted presumptive amount of discovery and a short
period to a certain trial date in the vast majority of cases.”).
322. See Subrin, supra note 213, at 177 (“[T]here is a subset of complex cases . . . that will
require active judicial case management and should not be subject to severe limitations on
discovery.”).
323. IAALS, supra note 103.
324. Id. at 3–4.
325. See id. at 5–7 (detailing the rules for governing pretrial conferences).
326. Id. at 2 (commenting on Rule 1.2).
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judge manages the case down to its appropriate size, an occurrence
327
which critics say rarely happens. The remedy, they say, is to flip the
default and adopt Chevy-size rules for all cases, leaving it to the judge
to manage the case up to its appropriate size.
Two things are undeniably true. The first is that, if we are going
to have a single set of rules for all cases, we must make—we cannot
help but make—a choice about where to set the default. The second
is that the location of that default will determine how judges manage.
Do they manage up, manage down, or manage from the middle? I
take very seriously the notion that we should pick the right default.
But does the current system fail to do that?
I understand the critics of the current system to make two claims.
The first is that the default limits for discovery should be reduced
because many litigants view the limits not as a flexible cap, as they
were intended, but as a target pinpointing the appropriate amount of
328
discovery to be taken. This claim views discovery as having the
defining characteristics of a gas—that is, it has no definite shape and
will expand to fill the size of its container. Thus, if the scope of
discovery is X, then the parties will take discovery to reach the limits
of X. Similarly, if the default rules allow ten depositions, then the
lawyers will reflexively take ten depositions whether they need them
or not, and so on. The second claim is that, for various strategic and
tactical reasons, lawyers are making deliberate choices to seek more
329
discovery than they need.
Lowering the default levels of discovery would respond to the
first claim. By shrinking the size of the container, the gas—
330
discovery—would contract accordingly. What may be needed,
327. Id. (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and many state rules already contain factors
that—where applied—address proportionality in discovery. However, these factors are rarely if
ever applied . . . .”).
328. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., supra note 80, at 7 (“Unfortunately, many lawyers believe that they should—or
must—take advantage of the full range of discovery options offered by the rules. They believe
that zealous advocacy (or fear of malpractice claims) demands no less and the current rules
certainly do not dissuade them from that view.”); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 14 (“[M]any lawyers are hesitant to limit the scope and tools of
discovery on their own accord, based in part on fears of malpractice claims.”).
329. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549, 570–72, 594–96 (2010) (noting that attorneys use the
discovery system, including e-discovery, to burden opponents with costly information requests
and to force settlement).
330. Note, however, that Boyle’s Law holds that the volume and pressure of a gas are
inversely proportional assuming a constant temperature. One necessary corollary of Boyle’s
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though, is empirical proof that discovery actually does exhibit the
physical properties of a gas. Rule 33 presumptively allows each party
331
to serve twenty-five interrogatories on any other party. If discovery
expands to the size of its container, we should expect each party to
serve their full quota of interrogatories in every case. Yet the data
from the latest FJC survey found that over 20 percent of plaintiffs and
332
defendants served no interrogatories at all. Similarly, Rule 30
333
presumptively allows each side ten depositions. Yet nearly half of
the respondents to the recent FJC survey reported taking no
334
nonexpert depositions. And in the cases in which nonexpert
depositions were taken, the average taken was 3.8 for plaintiffs and
2.8 for defendants, well below the ten per side we would expect to
find if lawyers were reflexively taking as much discovery as the rules
335
allowed.
As to the second claim, it is open to question whether lowering
the default level of discovery would make much of a difference.
Presumably, litigants motivated by strategic gains would continue to
seek those gains. For those litigants, a reform that flips the default to
require motions for permission to take discovery might simply end up
substituting “motions to enlarge” for “motions to limit.” Moreover,
there is good reason to think that opportunistic behavior in discovery
is a two-way street. Lowering the default limits would do little to
respond to the complaint that producing parties also engage in
336
discovery abuse for strategic gain.
What we need is to find the right balance—a default standard
that is neither overly generous nor overly restrictive. That, I think,
augurs for targeting the middle. I leave it to readers to decide

Law is that, if you shrink the size of the container, you increase the pressure the gas exerts on
the walls of the container unless you find a way to take heat out of the system at the same time.
331. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1).
332. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 9. The survey did not track the number of
interrogatories served in those cases in which they were used.
333. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that a party must obtain leave of the court if
a deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken).
334. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 10. Expert depositions were a comparative rarity,
with fewer than one in seven respondents reporting taking them in their closed cases. Id. at 9.
335. Id. at 10.
336. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery 5–6 (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/12C00D7
5EEE2711D8525764800454561/$File/Elizabeth Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery.pdf.
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337

whether the current Civil Rules hit that target. And if we are off
target, I also urge readers to consider whether the reform proposals
being circulated would put us in the middle or simply skew the
imbalance in a different direction. It may be that we need to correct
course in some fashion. But if we do that, we must be careful not to
oversteer.
CONCLUSION
For nearly thirty years, the Civil Rules have looked to judicial
case management as the principal means for controlling excessive cost
and delay in civil cases. Trial court judges have broad managerial
powers, particularly in defining the contours of discovery. We expect
trial court judges to use those powers aggressively, to take control of
cases early on, and to head off problems before they have a chance to
occur. Trial judges are consistently told that the best way to control
cost and delay is to intervene early, before things get out of hand.
Case management is the proverbial ounce of prevention.
Some, though, see case management as a cure worse than the
disease. Critics lament the role that case management has played in
the decline of trials and the shrinking pool of trial lawyers. They
express concern about how case-management decisions are opaque,
standardless, and unreviewable, heightening the risk that judges will
abuse their power. They see case management itself as a symptom of
a larger and more foundational flaw in the Civil Rules—the fact that
the rules are one-size-fits-all. They urge that what we need is not
more case management but new sets of rules that apply to different
categories of cases; being tailored to the needs of the cases in those
categories, these rules would not require so much ad hoc
customization by judges. They worry that case management is
inherently flawed in that it requires judges to make rational decisions
in contexts in which they lack sufficient data, leaving them at risk of
substituting their own biases.

337. If the results from the FJC’s Civil Rules survey are an accurate indication, the Civil
Rules may already strike the right balance. Survey respondents generally thought that the
amount of discovery under the Civil Rules was more or less right given the characteristics of the
case. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 27–28. Also, survey respondents generally thought
that the Civil Rules had about the right amount of case management. Id. at 67. It is certainly
true, however, that some of the other empirical studies do not evidence that level of satisfaction
with discovery or with existing norms of judicial case management.
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Others see case management as an important part of the puzzle
but insufficient by itself. They urge that the case-management scheme
be joined to other types of reforms to make it work effectively. Some
proposals would alter the structure of the existing rules scheme, such
as by altering the pleading requirements. Others would augment the
existing scheme with subject-specific protocols developed by the bar.
Still others would leave the existing scheme as it is but get it to work
better by changing the culture of adversarial discovery.
Rulemakers and outside reformers alike must appreciate that
case-management reform is not just a function of finding better casemanagement techniques or even of getting the relevant actors to use
the existing techniques more effectively. Case-management reform
necessarily entails revisiting the policy choices that underlie our
reliance on case management. How should judges be spending their
time? Does it still make sense to have (generally) one set of rules that
applies to all cases? Are we comfortable with the amount of
discretion that such a system necessarily must give to trial judges for it
to work? Would we be better off with multiple sets of rules, perhaps
for different subjects or for cases of different sizes? If we are going to
have just one set of rules, should we downsize those rules and require
judges to manage up instead of, as some perceive the current
situation, having rules built for the most complex cases such that
judges must manage down in the simple cases? The choices we
eventually make regarding how best to utilize case management must
ultimately depend on the degree to which we continue to believe that
the benefits of a system that relies on judicial case management
outweigh the costs.

